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The Solidarity Center is launching a new series, Justice for All: The Struggle for WorkerRights. This series follows the May 2003 publication of the Solidarity Center’s
groundbreaking Justice for All: A Guide to Worker Rights in the Global Economy. Through
powerful first-person narratives, the reports thoroughly examine worker rights, country
by country, in today’s global economy.
This first report, by renowned
worker rights researcher Lance
Compa, takes a hard look at
Mexico’s century-long fight for
independent, democratic trade
unions and social justice. Compa
puts Mexico’s labor law and practice
to the test against international
worker rights standards reflected in
International Labor Organization
conventions and the ILO’s 1998
Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.
Between 2001 and 2003, Compa
interviewed dozens of workers,
union leaders, government officials,
employer representatives, and advo-
cates from non-governmental
organizations. Their stories inform
much of this report.
The report also draws on worker
affidavits, complaints and reports
to public authorities, labor depart-
ment and court decisions, and laws
and draft legislation. It cites
numerous law journal and social
science research articles; ILO
reports; reports by governments,
By John J. Sweeney
President, AFL-CIO
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NGOs, and international trade
unions; and press accounts of labor
issues and disputes.
Worker rights in Mexico came to the
international forefront ten years ago,
when the U.S., Canadian, and
Mexican governments signed the
North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. NAFTA proponents promised
that the agreement would create new
jobs and higher wages for Mexican
workers. Mexican and U.S. unions
believe that NAFTA has under-
mined worker rights in both coun-
tries. Devaluation of the peso has cut
workers’ earning power nearly in
half. Moreover, the promised jobs 
are fast disappearing as companies
shutter their Mexican operations
and move to lower wage countries.
Now there is a proposed new hemi-
spheric trade pact, the Free Trade
Area of the Americas. FTAA would
expand NAFTA to 34 countries in
the Americas, creating the world’s
largest free trade zone. Many
observers fear that FTAA, as
presently proposed, would further
erode worker rights throughout the
hemisphere. Worker rights advocates
worldwide are mobilizing to make
sure that FTAA will not sacrifice
worker protections.
Compa suggests that with an
increasingly democratic govern-
ment, well-enforced labor laws,
and strong trade unions, Mexico
has the potential to be a leader on
worker rights standards among
developing countries in Latin
America and around the world. As
the violations documented in this
report make clear, however, Mexico
still falls short of international
worker rights standards.
■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  
This first report, by renowned worker rights champion Lance
Compa, takes a hard look at Mexico’s century-long fight for 
independent, democratic trade unions and social justice.
4Mexico is a federal republic of33 states and 100 million 
citizens. Its rich, vibrant culture is
shaped by influences that include
thousands of years of native peoples’
heritage, 400 years of Spanish
conquest and colonization, 150 years
of independence, and now almost a
century following a social revolution
that culminated in the landmark
constitution of 1917.
With perhaps the exception of the
new South African constitution,
Mexico has the most progressive
social charter in the world. Article
123 of the Mexican constitution
guarantees workers the right to
organize, the right to bargain, the
right to strike, the eight-hour day,
overtime pay, profit sharing, paid
maternity leave, just cause for
dismissal, and other social benefits
and protections.
Another obvious and critically
important influence on Mexico is its
status as a developing country
sharing a long border with the
United States. The history of U.S.
conquest and annexation of one-
third of Mexico’s national territory in
the 19th century resonates deeply
among the Mexican people, who
remain concerned about subjugation
to their giant neighbor to the north.
Movement for Social Justice
For decades, Mexico’s political and
economic landscape was dominated
by the ruling Institutional Revolu-
tionary Party (PRI). The PRI’s 
grip on Mexican life followed the
convulsive violence of the Mexican
Revolution, in which every successive
revolutionary leader was assassinated
and 10 percent of the entire popula-
tion was killed. Order and stability
became paramount political values
alongside policies characterized as
“revolutionary nationalism.” These
principles reflected both the demands
for social justice and the strong asser-
tion of Mexico’s distinct national
identity and national interest vis-
à-vis the United States.
From the time of the Spanish
conquest, Mexico’s workers have
carried on struggles of epic propor-
tions for social justice and worker
rights. Mineworkers in times past
and present; printers, textile workers,
and railroad workers in the 19th
century; oil, manufacturing, and
public sector workers in the 20th
century; maquiladora workers in the
late 20th and early 21st centuries—all
have mounted dramatic movements,
often against great odds, to establish
their organizations and secure the
benefits of collective bargaining and
protective labor legislation.
During the long years of PRI rule in
Mexico, many unions were drawn
into a classic corporatist relationship
with the government and employer
associations. Instead of acting inde-
pendently to carry out programs
developed by their members and
bargain freely with employers, many
unions subordinated their functions
to government dictates. In return for
seats in Congress set aside for union
officials and favored treatment by
successive PRI presidents and labor
secretaries, union leaders delivered
their members’ votes to PRI candi-
dates. This system left labor law
enforcement in the hands of tripar-
tite boards composed of government,
C H A P T E R  1
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business, and union representatives
committed to the corporatist system.
Neutral, independent agencies and
judicial bodies were not part of the
worker rights picture.
Until the 1980s, PRI governments
carried out economic policies broadly
associated with the “import substitu-
tion industrialization” (ISI) model of
economic development. High tariffs
kept out imports from other coun-
tries and protected domestic indus-
tries. The government nationalized
key sectors, especially oil resources
and production. Private companies
had to be majority owned by
Mexican investors. For many years,
ISI policies resulted in steady growth
and rising incomes, and so-called
“official” trade unions enjoyed secure,
privileged positions of power in the
economic structure. Even during this
period, however, many Mexican
workers created independent trade
unions and struggled for a more
democratic form of unionism.
Economic Pressure 
Leads to NAFTA
Mexico’s inward focused economy
began to stagnate when the funda-
mental poverty of most Mexicans
failed to sustain it. A foreign debt
crisis in the late 1980s brought
Mexico’s predicament to a head. One
option for the new administration of
President Carlos Salinas, who took
office in 1988 in an election widely
seen as fraudulent, was to declare a
debt moratorium. This would likely
provoke an investor boycott and
possible economic collapse.
Salinas’s other choice was to accept
the terms of the Brady Plan, a debt-
restructuring program authored by
U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady. Under the Brady Plan,
Mexico’s creditor banks in the
United States and Europe would
reduce payment obligations, while
Mexico agreed to meet stringent 
new requirements for economic
reform and favorable treatment of
foreign investors. Only the resulting
boom in foreign direct investment
would allow Mexico to repay its
debt, regardless of whether or not 
the boom benefited Mexico’s work-
ing and poor people.1
The pressure of the Brady Plan
prompted Salinas to move to negoti-
ations with the United States and
Canada on a North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The
three North American countries
signed a trade agreement in 1992
under the administrations of George
H.W. Bush, Carlos Salinas, and
Canadian Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney. However, NAFTA did
not take effect until 1994 after
changes in all three governments.
The delay was attributable to a
sharp struggle in the United States,
not just over NAFTA itself, but also 
over NAFTA’s social dimension,
the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).
After Bill Clinton won the
November 1992 election and took
office in January 1993, the new
administration began negotiations 
on labor and environmental side
agreements with Mexico and
Canada. However, instead of having
the U.S. Department of Labor,
under Secretary Robert Reich,
take the lead and invite trade union
consultation and participation in 
the negotiating process, Clinton
allowed the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative’s office, under USTR Mickey
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From the time of the Spanish conquest, Mexico’s workers have carried
on struggles of epic proportions for social justice and worker rights.
6
Kantor, to take over side agreement
negotiations and marginalize the
labor movement. Unions had no
voice in crafting the NAALC, in
sharp contrast to labor involvement
in negotiations for a social dimen-
sion in European Union and
Mercosur arrangements.2
In August 1993, the parties
concluded negotiations with final
agreements on the NAALC and a
companion environmental accord,
the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC). The labor accord created
a secretariat with a modest degree of
independence, but subject to over-
sight by the labor ministers. It set
forth “labor principles” that defined
the subject matter of the NAALC,
and it created a complaint mecha-
nism for private parties to initiate
cases under the agreement.
However, the labor principles were
divided into three tiers with unequal
treatment under the NAALC’s
review, evaluation, and dispute reso-
lution mechanisms. The lowest tier,
with minimal oversight in the form
of ministerial consultations, includes
what are called the industrial relations
principles—the right to organize, the
right to collective bargaining, and the
right to strike. A middle tier open to
evaluation by independent experts
includes matters of forced labor,
discrimination, and migrant workers’
rights. The only labor principles
subject to top-tier dispute resolution
by a panel of arbitrators are those
covering minimum wage, child labor,
and job health and safety.
Instead of creating a dynamic of
upward harmonization toward
international labor standards, the
agreements maintained sovereignty
over the substance of each country’s
labor laws and labor law enforce-
ment system—effectively locking in
existing low labor standards. Finally,
the NAALC failed to include a
strong enforcement mechanism 
like the one protecting investors 
and intellectual property holders.
Protecting Corporations at
the Expense of Worker Rights
NAFTA locked in place the neolib-
eral reforms of the 1980s and early
1990s while removing most protec-
tions for Mexican small businesses
and small agricultural producers.
The government ignored warnings
from domestic critics that NAFTA’s
commercial terms, with maximum
protection for companies and invest-
ors and minimal concern for human
rights, worker rights, the environ-
ment, and other social needs, would
have significant negative conse-
quences. The most devastating 
have hit Mexico’s small farmers,
displaced by the hundreds of thou-
sands from their lands and agricul-
tural life by massive imports of
subsidized agricultural products
from the United States.3 
Even before NAFTA, large
Mexican businesses had already
integrated themselves into the U.S.
economy, and many U.S., Japanese,
European, and other multinational
companies had already established
extensive operations in Mexico,
particularly in the maquiladora
factory zones along the U.S.-Mexico
border. By 2000, more than one
million workers labored in thou-
sands of maquiladora facilities.
The changed economic context had
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early 1990s while removing most protections for Mexican small
businesses and small agricultural producers.
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important effects on trade unions.
Thousands of unionized workers’
jobs in formerly protected sectors
disappeared. In the maquiladora
zones where thousands of new jobs
were created, employers resisted
union representation or welcomed
only unions that agreed to provide
labor peace, not representation for
workers. Democratic currents again
swelled in the labor movement,
sometimes in dissident movements
within official unions and some-
times in the formation of new, inde-
pendent unions and federations.
A New Political Era? 
The Fight for Worker 
Rights Continues
Mexico entered a new chapter in its
political history with the results of
the 1997 congressional election and
the 2000 presidential election. In
1997, the formerly PRI-dominated
Congress, which had mostly rubber-
stamped presidential decisions,
became a divided body in which no
single party held a majority. It now
had to act like a normal legislative
body, requiring formation of new
coalitions to enact laws.
In 2000, the victory of Vicente Fox,
the candidate of the conservative
National Action Party (PAN),
ended seven decades of unbroken
PRI presidential rule. Two noted
scholars of the Mexican labor
movement described the implica-
tions of Fox’s victory:4
“The ouster from power of Mexico’s
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) after 71 years promised to
rupture the longtime alliance
among organized labor, the state,
and the PRI. A transition to a
democratic political regime would
make possible for the first time a
shift away from an authoritarian-
corporatist system of industrial
relations toward a democratic
model of labor governance.”
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81 On Mexico’s acquiescence to the Brady Plan, see Peter T. Kilborn, “How the Mexican Debt Pact Was Achieved,” The New York Times, July 31,
1989, p. D1; Alejandro Ramos, “Mexico After the Brady Plan: Foreign Investment Is Key,” The Journal of Commerce, February 16, 1990, p. 8A.
2 An account of NAALC negotiations can be found in Maxwell A. Cameron and Brian W. Tomlin, The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was
Done (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2000). The chapter on the NAALC describes how Mexico’s trade minister, Arsenio Farrell II, told
businessmen that the NAALC was meaningless. For discussions of trade union involvement in EU and Mercosur affairs, see U.S.
Department of Labor, The Social Dimension of Economic Integration (2000); see also the web sites of the European Trade Union
Confederation at www.etuc.org and the Mercosur unions at www.sindicatomercosul.com.br.
3 See Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, “Trade Brings Riches, but Not to Mexico’s Poor: NAFTA’s Critics Say Pact Has Failed to Improve
Lives of Impoverished Majority,” The Washington Post, March 22, 2003, p. A10.
4 See Graciela Bensusán and Maria Lorena Cook, “Political Transition and Labor Revitalization in Mexico,” in Daniel Cornfield and Holly
McCammon, eds., Labor Revitalization, Vol. 11 in the Research in the Sociology of Work series (Greenwich, JAI Press, 2003).
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 1 But the possibility of a transition
toward a democratic model signaled
by Fox’s election has not been ful-
filled. As a conservative, pro-business
party, the PAN was not interested in
fostering a more democratic, dynamic
labor movement that might challenge
corporate power. Many of the domi-
nant official unions adjusted their
strategic alliances and reached accom-
modation with the PAN government
at the federal level and with PAN and
PRI governments in states where
those parties prevailed. These trade
union and government officials found
common cause in holding down
wages and controlling worker mili-
tancy to keep investors happy.
Despite persisting corporatism in
labor relations, many workers and
progressive leaders both inside and
outside the official labor movement
are continuing the fight for inde-
pendent, democratic trade unions.
Most of the cases examined in this
report stem from these struggles.
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Mexico has ratified all the principal United Nations covenants on human and worker rights:
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
In the Americas, Mexico has ratified the principal human and worker rights instruments:
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (“Pact of San Jose”)
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”)
Mexico has ratified six of the ILO’s fundamental conventions reflected in the 1998 Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work:
Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor
Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration
Convention No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labor
Convention No. 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor
Mexico has not ratified two of the ILO’s fundamental conventions:
Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
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10 Mexico’s constitution and lawsgenerally guarantee freedom
of association, the right to organize,
the right to collective bargaining,
and the right to strike. Moreover,
the constitution provides for exten-
sive economic and social rights: the
eight-hour day, paid maternity leave,
profit sharing, minimum wage, over-
time pay, housing, vacations, and
workplace health and safety.
Labor laws are federal, applying
throughout the national territory.
However, labor law enforcement is
divided between federal and state
authorities. Federal authorities
apply the law to industries whose
scope is national, and state authori-
ties to industries considered more
local. Despite their links to the
global economy and their centrality
in Mexico’s economic development
strategy, most of the thousands of
maquiladora factories in Mexico
come under state labor law enforce-
ment jurisdiction. This distinction
is important for understanding
worker rights violations that occur
in many maquiladora zones.
Federal and state Conciliation and
Arbitration Boards (CABs) enforce
labor laws in Mexico. CABs are
tripartite entities with representatives
of government, management, and
labor serving as a quasi-judicial labor
court. They decide labor disputes of
all kinds—those involving collective
matters such as organizing, bargain-
ing, and strike disputes, as well as
complaints by individual workers 
on such matters as overtime pay,
seniority violations, maternity leave,
unjust discharge, failure to pay
proper severance pay, and so on.
The CABs play a key role in unions’
obtaining recognition and “title”
(titularidad), or bargaining rights in
a workplace. The boards also inter-
vene directly in collective bargaining
negotiations and in strikes.
Worker rights observers often
charge that Mexico has great labor
laws but does not enforce them. This
criticism may be fair as a general
proposition, but it needs qualifica-
tion. Some of Mexico’s labor laws
actually violate international stan-
dards, as seen below in cases before
the ILO’s Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations (CEACR) and
Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation (CFA).
Mexican labor law has no provision
for a public registry of trade 
unions and collective bargaining
agreements. Many workers are
completely in the dark about
whether a union exists at their
workplace, or, if they know of 
the union, they cannot obtain a
copy of the collective agreement.
Unlike many developing countries,
Mexico has an extensive labor law
enforcement capacity and infrastruc-
ture. The problem is not that laws
are not enforced at all. More often,
the problem is one of selective
enforcement, with tripartite labor
law authorities favoring unions
subservient to federal or state
government policies and disfavoring
independent unions and dissident
worker activists and supporters.1
The discrimination that dissident
and independent trade unionists
face is exacerbated by the preva-
Freedom of Association, the Right to Organize,
and the Right to Bargain Collectively 
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lence of “exclusion clauses” in
collective bargaining agreements.
The Federal Labor Law allows
employers and unions to insert
exclusion clauses into collective
agreements. These clauses require
workers to be members of the
union before an employer may hire
them, making the union in effect
the hiring agent for the company.
Exclusion clauses also require an
employer to dismiss any worker
expelled from union membership.
Most unions’ bylaws authorize
expulsion of members who join or
support other unions. Using the
exclusion clause, incumbent unions
can force the dismissal of workers
who run afoul of union leadership.
In April 2001, the Mexican
Supreme Court ruled that using
exclusion clauses against dissidents
violated workers’ right to freedom 
of association. However, under
Mexico’s judicial system, several
more such rulings are necessary to
make them binding precedent and
to force a change in the law and an
end to the practice. In the mean-
time, many unions still use the ex-
clusion clause to get rid of workers
who challenge them.2
Convention No. 87 on
Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right 
to Organize
Mexico has ratified Convention No.
87. The CEACR, which oversees 
the performance of countries that
have ratified ILO conventions, has
singled out several aspects of Mexico’s 
labor legislation as violations of
Convention No. 87, including:
■ The prohibition against the coex-
istence of two or more unions in
the same state agency.
■ The prohibition against a public
employee trade union member
from resigning union membership
(as distinct from any continuing
obligation to pay union dues).
■ The prohibition against re-elec-
tion of public employee trade
union officers.
■ The prohibition against public
employees’ unions joining 
federated organizations with 
other unions.
■ Restrictions on freedom of 
association for bank workers 
and their unions.
■ The prohibition against foreigners
being members of trade union
executive bodies.
■ Restrictions on the right to 
strike of public employees and
bank workers.
The ILO notes the significance of 
a 1999 Mexican Supreme Court
decision upholding the ILO’s posi-
tion that these elements of Mexico’s
Federal Labor Law Apartado B
(part B, on public employees) violate
Convention No. 87. In that decision,
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled
that the federal labor law’s require-
ment for a single trade union mono-
poly in each federal agency, without
the possibility of workers’ forming
another union of their own choosing,
as well as the mandate of the same
monopoly for a single federation 
of public employee unions, violates
Mexico’s own constitutional guar-
antee of freedom of association and
its obligations under Convention No.
87, whose ratification by Mexico
makes it part of national law.
■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■   ■  ■  ■   ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  
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The CEACR stated, “The Commit-
tee once again expresses the firm
hope that the Government [of
Mexico] will take measures to repeal
or amend these legislative provisions
with a view to bringing them into
line with [the Mexican Supreme
Court’s ruling].” On the violation 
of bank workers’ right to strike, the
CEACR said, “The Committee
therefore once again requests the
Government to take the necessary
measures to amend the provisions
which are in violation of the Con-
vention, so that the legislation is
explicitly adjusted to reflect national
practice and the principles of
freedom of association.”3
Notwithstanding the Mexican
Supreme Court’s ruling and the
CEACR’s repeated admonitions,
Mexico has failed to revise laws estab-
lishing trade union monopoly in the
public sector, prohibiting foreigners
from serving as trade union officers,
and prohibiting re-election of public
employee trade union officers. In fact,
Mexico has not revised a single aspect
of federal labor law repeatedly found
to be in violation of Convention No.
87 for the past 30 years, and it has
failed to revise aspects of the law
found to be unconstitutional by
Mexico’s own Supreme Court.
This is not a situation where a
country’s supreme court has found
that national law overrides ILO
obligations under a “later-in-time”
doctrine or other theory under
which national law may supersede
international norms. Here, the
Mexican Supreme Court has found
that national law violates both the
international norm and the national
constitution. A more serious
example of a government’s disdain
for its international obligations and
its own domestic judicial authority
is hard to imagine.
Convention No. 98 on the
Right to Organize and
Collective Bargaining
Mexico has not ratified ILO Con-
vention No. 98. However, like all ILO
member countries, it is obligated
under the ILO Constitution to ad-
here to the substantive provisions of
the Convention.4 The ILO Commit-
tee on Freedom of Association over-
sees adherence to non-ratified core
conventions. The CFA receives
complaints against countries for
violations of Conventions Nos. 87
and 98, regardless of ratification,
and issues authoritative findings 
of compliance and non-compliance
with these conventions.
Violations of ILO Conventions
The CFA has repeatedly found
Mexico in violation of Convention
Nos. 87 and 98:
■ In a 1995 case on workers’ efforts
to form an independent trade
union in the Environment,
Natural Resources, and Fisheries
Ministry, the CFA noted that “it
is impossible for public service
workers to set up trade union
organizations of their choice
outside the established union
structure.”5 The CFA requested
the Mexican government—“as the
[CEACR] has been doing for
several years,” it added exasperat-
edly—“to take the necessary
measures to ensure that both in
law and practice public service
workers can freely establish and
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join independent trade unions of
their own choosing . . . .”6
■ In a 1999 case involving the
denial of the right to organize, the
right to bargain collectively, and
the right to strike for instructors
at CONALEP, the National
College of Technical Occupa-
tional Education, the CFA con-
cluded that without these rights,
and “contrary to the Govern-
ment’s statements,” the teachers’
association “does not allow them
to defend and promote the inter-
ests of their members in a valid
and effective manner from the
standpoint of the requirements of
Convention No. 87 and the prin-
ciples of freedom of association 
in general.”7
■ In a 2001 case involving dis-
missals of dozens of airline pilots
who voted for an independent
union in the Aviacsa airline, the
CFA noted “the high number of
dismissals in the context of a
collective bargaining dispute and
that the Government merely
points out the existence of the
possibility of taking legal action.”
The CFA asked the government
“to ensure that the relevant
inquiries are conducted immedi-
ately” and “to consider the possi-
bility of ensuring the reinstate-
ment of these workers as soon as
possible.” As of late 2003, the
fired workers had still not had
their cases resolved.8
The U.S. State Department’s 2002
Country Report on Human Rights
Practices noted several serious prob-
lems with Mexico’s performance on
workers’ freedom of association, the
right to organize, and the right to
bargain collectively. The report
pointed out obstacles to inde-
pendent union formation, noting
that the labor department and labor
boards “occasionally have withheld
or delayed registration of unions
[and] also have registered unions
that turned out to be run by extor-
tionists or labor racketeers falsely
claiming to represent unions.”9
As noted above, Mexico’s labor
boards that grant registration and the
authority to bargain contracts are
tripartite bodies with government,
business, and labor representatives.
The tripartite arrangement is part of
Mexico’s long-standing corporatist
system that maintained tight govern-
ment control over many aspects of
civil society. The tripartite boards
favor official, pro-government, pro-
employer unions against inde-
pendent organizations chosen by
workers. As the State Department’s
report noted, this approach “can
sometimes lead to unfair partiality in
representation disputes.”
“Sometimes” is an understatement.
The iron triangle of government,
employer, and official union control
over workers’ organizing and collec-
tive bargaining still prevails in most
jurisdictions, especially in states with
high concentrations of maquiladora
factories. State governments have
important authority over labor law
and labor relations matters in
Mexico. In many states, the gover-
nor and the state administration
openly favor investors, executives,
and pro-government, pro-employer
unions over independent worker
organizations.10
The problems documented by ILO
committees, the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), the U.S. State Depart-
ment, and independent NGOs
cluster around the single greatest
deficiency in Mexico’s fulfillment of
international norms on workers’
freedom of association: the
continued entrenchment of undem-
ocratic unions not chosen by
workers, not representative of
workers, and not responsive to
workers. Some such unions reflect
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official unionism that is the legacy
of corporatist links to the PRI
during its seven decades of authori-
tarian rule over the Mexican body
politic.11 The PRI was unseated 
in the 2000 presidential elections,
but many corporatist unions deftly
recalibrated their political links 
to find accommodation with the
new PAN administration.
This situation does not mean that
all unions affiliated with the tradi-
tional corporatist union sector are
undemocratic and unresponsive.
Many official union affiliates and
many local trade unions within offi-
cial unions are democratically run
and do a good job bargaining for
members. The same can be said in
reverse for the independent union
sector: some of these unions fall
short of the virtues claimed for
their independent status. However,
many worker rights violations in
Mexico arise from ongoing conflicts
between authoritarian, pro-govern-
ment, pro-business unions associ-
ated with the corporatist tradition
and independent, democratic
unions struggling to bring genuine
representation to Mexican workers.
The other brand of undemocratic
unions in Mexico is the unions that
exist on paper and nominally hold
collective contracts with employers,
but serve only the interests of
employers and corrupt individuals
who administer these paper unions
for their own pecuniary gain. Real
trade unionists call them “protection
unions” because they protect employ-
ers from authentic self-organization
and free collective bargaining by
workers. Experts have estimated that
some 90 percent of all collective
agreements filed with the Mexican
labor department are fraudulent
“protection contracts” (contratos de
protección) or “pretend contracts”
(contratos simulados) meant only to
block real unions from forming.12
The State Department’s human
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rights report noted, “[P]rotection
contracts, to which the workforce is
not privy, are used in the maquila
sector and elsewhere to discourage
the development of authentic
unions. These contracts are collec-
tive bargaining agreements negoti-
ated and signed by management and
a representative of a so-called labor
organization, sometimes even prior
to the hiring of a single worker.”
The ICFTU described the “protec-
tion contract” system in its 2003
Annual Survey of Violations of Trade
Union Rights:13
“Establishing an independent trade
union, in other words a union that
is not controlled by the employer,
can resemble an obstacle course.
The difficulties associated with
obtaining legal status are used by
the government to deny a union
the right to register or to give pref-
erence to a particular union leader
over another. Employers them-
selves sometimes set up a union,
although workers may not even
know there is one in their factory,
because there are no meetings, no
elections, and no collective bar-
gaining. In practice, deficiencies in
the Federal Employment Law have
been exploited to create false
collective agreements called ‘pro-
tection contracts.’ These contracts
consist of an agreement whereby
the company pays a monthly sum
to the union. In exchange, the
union guarantees social peace.
Blacklists of trade unionists’ names
regularly circulate in the factories.”
The ICFTU hardly exaggerated the
problem. In 2002 the head of one of
Mexico’s largest employer federa-
tions, Canacintra, brazenly an-
nounced plans to create an Internet
blacklist of workers and trade union-
ists deemed “conflictive” who should
be denied employment in maqui-
ladora factories. The criteria for
designation as “conflictive” included
trade union organizing, asking for
higher wages, and seeking better
working conditions.14
In its 2003 annual World Report,
Human Rights Watch also pointed
to the protection contract problem:15
“Legitimate labor organizing activity
continued to be obstructed by
collective bargaining agreements
negotiated between management
and pro-business unions. These
agreements often failed to provide
worker benefits beyond the
minimum standards mandated by
Mexican legislation, and workers
sometimes only learned of the agree-
ments when they grew discontented
and attempted to organize inde-
pendent unions. Yet when workers
sought to displace non-independent
unions, they ran the risk of losing
their jobs. For example, efforts to
form independent unions in facto-
ries that produced for the Alcoa
corporation in Piedras Negras,
Coahuila, failed in October when
management fired independent
union leaders, elected in March,
in one plant, as well as a slate of
independent candidates who had
announced their intention to run in
future union leadership elections in
another plant.”
An experienced labor lawyer and
advisor to the conservative PAN
gave an extended account of the
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corporatist system under state
governments in a March 2003
interview, confirming that state
governors and official union 
leaders are in a tight alliance 
with companies to establish and
maintain unions that will control
workers’ demands and meet
employers’ demands.
“Potential investors sit down with
people from the governor’s
economic development office. If it’s
a major company or a large factory
coming in, the governor himself
comes to the meeting. The
governor tells the company, ‘This is
the union you will have, and this
union will make sure you don’t
have any labor troubles.’
“Usually, Mexican labor lawyers who
advise foreign investors have already
explained how the system works.
Sometimes they have to spend a lot
of time convincing investors that
they should accept a union because
the union will control the workers,
not challenge the company. Then,
even before the plant opens, the
company signs a collective agreement
with the chosen union just listing the
legal minimums, and the contract is
deposited with the state labor
department. The plant opens, and
workers don’t even know that they
have a union and a contract. The
company just pays the union directly
for what amounts to union dues.
“With the guarantee of a protection
contract, companies often fail to
provide decent wages and condi-
tions or training and upgrading of
workers’ skills. Problems start
coming out—low wages, danger-
ous conditions, bad food, forced
overtime, harassment, and other
abuses. Workers start to organize a
union so they can bargain for
improvements.
“Now the workers learn that they
already have a union and a
contract. Sometimes the official
union representative will start to
come around and fix a few little
things to cool things off. If the
workers persist and try to register
their union with the state labor
board, they run into the next big
obstacles. First, the employers
often fire the organizing leaders
and force them to take a small
severance payment so they have
money to live on. They could chal-
lenge their firings at the state labor
board, but these tripartite bodies
have seats for governor’s political
party, the state employers’ federa-
tion, and the official union federa-
tion. Procedures there are a black
hole of delays and runarounds, so
fired workers usually have no
choice but to take their severance
pay and look for another job.
“If the firings don’t deter workers
and they still try to register their
independent union and obtain a
vote to change unions, the same
labor board ties them up in delays
for many months and into years. If
a vote finally takes place, it is by
open, oral, voice vote by each
worker going past a threatening
mass of thugs brought in by the
official union to intimidate them,
and appearing individually at a
table where state government,
official union, and company
management representatives take
their votes. Those workers who 
dare to say they favor the inde-
pendent union are often fired,
and they face the same problems 
as the leaders fired before.”
This analysis of the pattern of viola-
tions of workers’ freedom of associa-
tion in Mexico comes from a
moderate labor lawyer not associated
with more radical labor advocates.
He puts his evaluation in the context
of Mexico’s development needs for
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greater productivity and labor-
management cooperation. This
system must be challenged and
changed, he argued, “because only
with freely chosen unions can
workers negotiate pay raises linked
to increased productivity, with
greater skills training and opportu-
nities for advancement.”
The Right to Strike
Mexico’s constitution guarantees
workers’ right to strike, and federal
labor laws on their face provide
ample protection of the right to
strike. No-strike clauses are not
permitted in collective bargaining
agreements. Sympathy strikes and
secondary boycotts are allowed.
Not only is it forbidden for employ-
ers to hire replacement workers, but
also employers must cease opera-
tions when workers declare a strike.
Strikers are allowed to take control
of company premises, with the legal
obligation to preserve and protect
the employer’s assets and to main-
tain minimum operations and serv-
ices to the extent necessary for such
protection and for public welfare.
Despite these guarantees, govern-
ment enforcement of labor laws has
more often stifled workers’ right to
strike than protected it. Complicated
rules on strike votes, advance notice
before striking, the timing of a strike,
picket line conduct, minimum opera-
tions and services, and other vari-
ables allow the CAB with relevant
jurisdiction to declare a strike vari-
ously “illicit,” “illegal,” “unjustified,”
or “nonexistent” on the flimsiest of
pretexts. Any of these findings halts
a strike and requires workers to
return to their jobs or face dismissal.
The government also has ample
powers to effectuate a requisa, a
takeover and continued operation of
a business facing a strike.
Federal and state governments,
acting through their controlled,
tripartite CABs, broke many strikes
in the 1980s and 1990s as pro-
investor policies took hold. Such
government-sponsored strike-
breaking was especially prevalent in
industries with traditionally strong
unions that resisted successive
governments’ neoliberal economic
policies. In 1987 and 1988, the last
years of the presidency of Miguel de
la Madrid, the federal CAB declared
strikes by AeroMéxico airline
workers and by workers at the Ford
Motor Co. assembly plant in
Cuautitlán, near Mexico City, illegal.
Similar findings broke strikes at the
Modelo Brewery in Mexico City in
1990, again at the Ford Cuautitlán
plant in 1990-1991, and at the
Volkswagen assembly plant in Puebla
in 1992, all under the presidency of
Carlos Salinas. President Ernesto
Zedillo broke a strike by flight atten-
dants at Aerovías de México airline
in 1998.16 In the final weeks of the
Zedillo administration, the govern-
ment broke a strike by workers at the
big Volkswagen plant in Puebla by
ruling that the strike began at 12:01
a.m. rather than 12:00 midnight.17
Some developments early in the
presidency of Vicente Fox hinted at
a shift in the Mexican government’s
traditionally heavy-handed inter-
vention against workers’ right to
strike. Strikes at AeroMéxico and
at Volkswagen were allowed to run
their course without government
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action to end them. The strikes
were settled quickly with good
gains for workers and expressions 
of satisfaction by management. It
remains to be seen whether these
incidences signal a fundamental
change in Mexico’s policy toward
free collective bargaining and the
right to strike.18
Pending Labor 
Law Reform Proposals
In early 2003 the Mexican Congress
began considering proposals for the
first substantial changes to labor 
law in more than 30 years. While
the outcome of congressional de-
bates remains uncertain, the two
proposals reflect many issues that
this chapter addresses.
The Abascal Proposal
The first reform proposal was sub-
mitted by Labor Minister Carlos
Abascal with support from the main
employer federations and the official
union hierarchy. Independent union
forces strongly opposed the Abascal
proposal, with good reason. The
proposal would establish in law even
more systematic violations of work-
ers’ freedom of association. It would
tighten government control of union
formation and collective bargaining
while granting employers new
unilateral powers to sidetrack
unions. Instead of responding to
calls for a judicially independent
labor authority, the proposal would
keep the corporatist tripartite labor
boards made up of government,
management, and official union
representatives.
The Abascal proposal would do
nothing to increase transparency in
union affairs. It rejects independent
unions’ long-standing demand to 
list local unions and collective
bargaining agreements in a public
registry available to all citizens.
The Mexican government accepted
management lobbyists’ risible 
argument that collective bargaining
agreements are “business secrets” that
should not be publicly disclosed.19
The Abascal proposal would also
create enormous obstacles to workers’
right to organize. First, it would
tighten jurisdictional rules defining
which labor organizations can repre-
sent workers according to craft,
enterprise, and company. The effect
would be to “lock in” bargaining
monopoly by incumbent official
unions and insulate them against
challenges from independent unions.
Finally, the Abascal proposal would
require prior disclosure of the name
and address of every worker who
joins an independent union, then
have the federal or state labor board
with jurisdiction in the matter
investigate each worker’s signature.
Under current law, only the leaders
of an independent union movement
in a workplace have to take the risk
of identifying themselves when they
seek registration. Requiring every
worker’s name and address and
making this information immedi-
ately available to management and
to an incumbent official puts all
workers at the risk of reprisals and
would have a chilling effect on
workers’ freedom of association. In
addition, the proposal would shift
the burden of proof in individual
discharge cases, making it more
difficult for workers who suffer
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reprisals for independent organizing
efforts to defend themselves in
unfair dismissal cases.
The Alternative 
Labor Reform Bill
In April 2003, a coalition of legisla-
tors introduced an alternative labor
reform bill that corrected many of
the flaws noted above. The April bill
contained these elements:
■ A public registry of trade unions,
their constitutions and bylaws,
and collective bargaining agree-
ments, administered by a decen-
tralized independent body along
the lines of the respected Federal
Election Institute.
■ Eased jurisdictional rules that
would allow workers in different
crafts, enterprises, and industries
to opt for independent union
representation.
■ Secret ballot elections by rank and
file members for union leadership.
■ Secret ballot elections for choice
of union representation.
■ Prohibitions and legal penalties
against employers and labor 
officials involved in protection
contracts.
The April reform proposal also
addresses employer and union con-
cerns to achieve more modern and
efficient operations. It would pro-
mote bargaining over productivity
and profit sharing, with companies
providing more information to
workers and their representatives.
It would grant more flexibility in
setting work schedules, combining
job descriptions, promoting employ-
ees on the basis of their ability as
well as seniority, lengthening proba-
tion periods, and other goals long
sought by employers in Mexico.
However, such changes would have
to be negotiated with workers’
unions, not imposed unilaterally.
The outcome of these initiatives has
not been settled. Midterm elections
in 2003 did not dramatically alter the
balance of power in Congress in a
way that would accelerate labor law
reform measures. The PRI gained
seats, but none of the three major
parties holds a legislative majority.
Whether or not Congress acts on
labor law reform before the presi-
dential campaign cycle gets under-
way in advance of 2006 elections is
still an open question. However,
pressure continues on Mexico 
from the business sector and from
neoliberal economists and interna-
tional funding agencies to weaken
collective bargaining and worker
protection laws.
At an October 2003 conference, one
economist told assembled execu-
tives, bankers, and government offi-
cials that Mexico's progressive
Article 123 of the Constitution is
“obsolete,” an obstacle to growth
because it stresses social equality
rather than productivity. Instead, he
argued, labor law reform should
“punish the mediocre and reward
those that achieve.” A World Bank
official concurred, saying labor law
reform should “redistribute
workers,” not redistribute wealth.20
20
■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  ■  
Endnotes
1 For more detail, see Jerome Levinson, “NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement: Lessons from the First Three Years” (Washington: Institute for
Policy Studies and International Labor Rights Fund, November 21, 1996).
2 See José Antonio Torres, “Los sindicatos se dispersan por libre asociación de obreros,” Spanish Newswire Services, April 19, 2001.
3 See Observation of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Ratified Conventions and Recommendations (2001).
4 Furthermore, under the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Mexico has committed itself to respect the prin-
ciples and rights enshrined in Convention No. 98.
5 See Report No. 300 of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Mexico (Case No. 1844), May 31, 1995.
6 Id.
7 See Report No. 326 of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Mexico (Case No. 2013), February 18, 1999.
8 See Report No. 329 of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Mexico (Case No. 2136), June 14, 2001.
9 See U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2002, Mexico, Section 6 (a) (2003). For reasons unknown, the 2002 report elimi-
nated language from the 2001 report explaining that authorities denied union registration to unions “hostile to government policies, influ-
ential employers, or established unions.” This is an essential problem of freedom of association in Mexico: authorities’ favoritism toward
unions friendly to government policies and influential employers, and authorities’ reprisals against independent unions that challenge
government policies, influential employers, and pro-government, pro-employer unions.
10 For a technical description of Mexico’s labor laws and labor law system, including the division of jurisdiction between the federal
government and the states, see Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, North American Commission for Labor
Cooperation, Labor Relations Law in North America (Washington, D.C. 2000).
11 See Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995).
12 See José Alfonso Bouzas, “Contratos colectivos de protección y el proyecto official de reformas laborales,” in Reforma Laboral: Análisis
crítico del Proyecto Abascal de reforma a la Ley Federal del Trabajo (UNAM 2003), pp. 97-115.
13 See ICFTU, Mexico: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (2003).
14 See Norma Patino Villalobos and María Esther Rodríguez, “La Canacintra busca fichar a trabajadores ‘conflictivos,’” Novedades,
February 28, 2002.
15 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002, available online at www.hrw.org/wr2k3/americas8.html.
■ JUSTICE for ALL
21
The Struggle for Worker Rights IN MEXICO
16 On these strikes, see Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in Mexico (Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1995); Maria Lorena Cook, “Mexican State-Labor Relations and the Political Implications of Free Trade,” Latin
American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter 1995); Dan LaBotz, Mask of Democracy (Boston, South End Press, 1992); Aviation Daily,
“AFA Claims Mexican Abuse of Power in AeroMéxico Flight Attendant Strike,” September 14, 1998.
17 See “VW Seeks Strike Ruling from Mexican Court,” Los Angeles Times, August 23, 2000, p. C-4; James F. Smith, “Mexico VW strikers
Yield to Order but Signal New Stance for Unions,” Los Angeles Times, August 24, 2000, p. C-1; Geri Smith, “Mexican Workers Deserve
Better Than This,” Business Week, September 11, 2000, p. 127.
18 On these strikes, see Tim Weiner, “Attendants Accept 9.5% Raise And End Strike at AeroMéxico,” The New York Times, June 4, 2001, p.
C2; Chris Kraul, “Mexico’s Unions Gain Muscle With VW Strike,” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 2001, p. Business 1.
19 On this point, see Arturo Alcalde, “Reforma laboral: Una iniciativa para fortalecer el corporativismo,” in Reforma Laboral: Análisis crítico
del Proyecto Abascal de reforma a la Ley Federal del Trabajo (UNAM 2003), p. 23. 
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Mexico has ratified ILOConvention No. 111 but has
failed to stop a continuing blatant
violation of workers’ right to be free
of discrimination in the workplace:
testing women workers of childbear-
ing age for pregnancy and punishing
those who test positive. This practice
is widespread, especially in the
maquiladora factories. Employers
refuse to hire applicants on the basis
of their pregnancy status. Employers
either find pretexts to dismiss current
employees who are pregnant, or else
transfer them to undesirable shifts or
jobs to pressure them to quit work.
This form of discrimination against
women workers has been the subject
of analysis and reports by the ILO,
the U.S. State Department’s
Country Report on Human Rights
Practices, independent human rights
organizations, and bodies created by
the NAALC.
The CEACR has repeatedly dealt
with pregnancy discrimination 
in Mexican maquiladora factories
without obtaining satisfactory
responses or action from the govern-
ment. In 2000 the CEACR reminded
Mexico that the Committee “had
requested the government to . . .
take action to end these practices . . .
but observes that the Government’s
report contains no information 
on definite measures adopted or 
envisaged to investigate, penalize 
or eradicate such practices.”
In its 2000 statement, the CEACR
emphasized:
“Discriminatory practices against
women workers in export proc-
essing zones continue to occur. For
example, women are required to
provide urine samples and, during
the probationary period, provide
proof to the enterprise of the
continuation of their menstrual
cycles. . . . According to the report
of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights . . . export
processing zones impose pregnancy
tests on women as a condition of
employment and deny them work 
if the result is positive. In some
cases, if a woman becomes pregnant
shortly after she begins to work 
in the plant, she may be mistreated
and forced to leave the job for 
that reason. . . .”
The CEACR spelled out in detail the
steps that the Mexican government
should take to halt this violation:1
“The Committee trusts that the
Government will take appropriate
measures to investigate and elimi-
nate such discriminatory practices
and thus bring their legislation and
practice into conformity with the
Convention; these measures could
include, for example, sending a clear
message to employers and workers
to the effect that all action taken
with a view to requiring women to
undergo pregnancy tests constitutes
discrimination based on sex; taking
measures to penalize employers 
who persist in imposing such
discriminatory practices; estab-
lishing of effective mechanisms of
prevention, complaint, investiga-
tion and compensation where
appropriate and, to this end,
strengthening the labor inspection
services and involving the bodies
specialized in promotion and pre-
vention, application and moni-
Discrimination in the Workplace
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toring of the principles of the
Convention.”
In 2002 and 2003 the CEACR took
special note of  “allegations received
over various years concerning a series
of systematic discriminatory employ-
ment practices in export processing
zones (the maquiladora industry).
These practices discriminate against
women by requiring pregnancy tests
and other discriminatory practices as
a condition for access to employment
in maquiladoras. These practices are
also carried out against women
already employed in maquiladoras.”2
The CEACR noted the Mexican
government’s claim of addressing
the problem through consultations,
information campaigns and the like,
but expressed doubt, accompanied
by impatience, whether these mech-
anisms dealt with the pregnancy
discrimination problem:3
“With reference to its previous
request, the Committee once again
asks the government to indicate
whether the seminars, meetings
and conferences, the Action Plan
‘More and Better Jobs for Women
in Mexico,’ and the awareness
campaigns on labor rights and
obligations for women, undertaken
by the General Directorate of
Equality and Gender, include the
problem of compulsory pregnancy
tests as part of the recruitment
procedure, especially in export
processing zones.”
The CEACR concluded that steps
like these, whatever their long-term
value, did not go to the heart of the
problem:
“The Committee once again reiterates
that the alleged practices referred to
above constitute discrimination in
employment and occupation on
grounds of sex and requests the
government to take appropriate
measures to investigate and eliminate
such discriminatory practices. In this
context, it requests the Government
to amend the Federal Labor Law to
explicitly prohibit discrimination
based on sex in recruitment and
hiring for employment and in 
conditions of employment.”
The government of Mexico has
ignored the CEACR’s recommenda-
tions, apparently bowing to the
lobbying influence of maquiladora
factory owners with a direct
economic stake in continued discrim-
ination against women workers.
The U.S. State Department’s 2002
Country Report on Human Rights
Practices addressed the question of
sexual harassment against women in
these terms:4
“The Federal Criminal Code
includes penalties for sexual harass-
ment, but victims must press
charges. Many female victims 
were reluctant to come forward,
and cases were difficult to prove.
Sexual harassment in the workplace
is widespread. In May 2001, the
Human Rights Commission of 
the Federal District (CDHDF)
estimated that at least 80 percent 
of the women who work in 
Mexico City have experienced
sexual harassment.”
On pregnancy discrimination, the
State Department said this:5
“Labor law provides extensive mater-
nity protection, including 6 weeks’
leave before and after childbirth and
time off for breast feeding in ade-
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quate and hygienic surroundings
provided by the employer. Employ-
ers are required to provide a preg-
nant woman with full pay, are
prohibited from dismissing her,
and must remove her from heavy 
or dangerous work or exposure to
toxic substances. To avoid these
expensive requirements, some
employers, including some in the
maquila industry, reportedly violate
these provisions by requiring preg-
nancy tests in preemployment
physicals, by regular examinations
and inquiries into women’s repro-
ductive status (including additional
pregnancy tests), by exposing 
pregnant women to difficult or
hazardous conditions to make
them quit, or by dismissing them.”
The pregnancy testing practice was
revealed in a landmark 1996 report
by Human Rights Watch, working
in collaboration with Mexican
women’s rights groups.6 Their inter-
views with hundreds of women
workers from dozens of factories,
the majority of them owned by
U.S.-based multinational compa-
nies, confirmed the widespread
abuse of pregnancy testing to deny
employment and to get rid of preg-
nant workers.
An important follow-up Human
Rights Watch study in 1998
showed that the pregnancy testing
practice continued unabated,
despite public pronouncements 
by many U.S. companies that they
were shocked to learn that preg-
nancy discrimination was going 
on in their factories and that they
would halt the practice. Instead,
Human Rights Watch concluded,
it was still “rampant.”7 As for action
by the Mexican government:
“Rather than condemn such prac-
tices, the Mexican government has
taken every opportunity to inter-
pret and apply labor law in a way
that most favors the discriminatory
practices of the corporations and
affords women the least amount of
protection. In fact, the government
has even gone so far as to excuse
publicly this discrimination. The
Labor Department of the state of
Baja California, which is charged
with enforcing the federal labor
code at the state level, issued a
press release . . . indicating that
pregnancy testing in the hiring
process was legal and was in fact a
corporation’s fulfillment of an
authority granted to it by the labor
law. . . . Since the Mexican govern-
ment does not consider the deter-
mination and use of pregnancy
status in the employment process
to violate its federal labor code, the
government in fact ignores the
most pervasive and openly prac-
ticed type of sex discrimination
that exists in that sector: hiring-
process sex discrimination. Female
job seekers in Mexico cannot rely
on the government for protection
from discrimination in the work-
force. . . . By failing to address and
remedy these practices, the
Mexican government not only
violates its own domestic laws
prohibiting discrimination and
guaranteeing the protection of
women’s reproductive health, but
also fails to fulfill its international
human rights obligations to protect
those under its jurisdiction from
human rights abuses. . . .”
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The NAALC Pregnancy
Discrimination Case
Human Rights Watch and allied
NGOs in the United States and
Mexico filed a complaint with the
U.S. National Administrative Office
(NAO) under the NAALC, citing
its Labor Principle 7 on the elimina-
tion of employment discrimination.
The NAO held a public hearing in
San Antonio, Texas, where many
worker witnesses testified about
their experience. María Vázquez
Pérez8 stated that she was required
to fill out a questionnaire that
included “. . . a series of questions
that had nothing to do with body
illnesses but rather with the private
issues of life, which I felt were very
intimate and that had nothing to do
with my need or my skill in
performing a job. These questions
basically were my last menstruation,
sexual activity, [and] birth control
methods as well as questions on the
[number] of children that one had.”
She added that she found this expe-
rience to be “humiliating because
they invade the most intimate part
of a woman.”
Ana Rosa Rodríguez testified that
she underwent a physical examina-
tion shortly after beginning work in
a maquiladora factory:
“The doctor, who no longer works at
the company, carried out the exam,
which was basically a urine sample,
blood sample, as well as blood pres-
sure testing, clinical information,
your health, which is part of the
exam. He asked me questions on
my sexual activity, the use of birth
control methods, and the date of
my last menstruation. When I was
asked for the urine sample, I asked
what that sample was for. The nurse
told me that it was for pregnancy
tests. And, playing around, I asked,
‘And if I’m pregnant?’ She replied
‘Well, we will kick you out of here,’
which means that I would be fired.”
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Dulce María González testified that
at her medical examination, she was
asked “. . . if I was pregnant and the
last date of my menstruation. They
also asked me if I was sexually active
and what kind of birth control
methods I was using. At the end of
the interview [on] the medical
background, the nurse gave me a
form and said, ‘Sign it.’ I asked her
what I was going to sign and why.
She said that it was a letter stating if
I became pregnant during the hiring
period of three months, I would be
automatically fired.”
The U.S. NAO recommended mini-
sterial consultations in the case,
which led to conferences, research
reports, and “outreach initiative” on
women workers’ rights. However,
this process failed to bring about
action called for by Human Rights
Watch’s recommendations and by
the CEACR. Mexico has failed to
change the law where necessary
and to effectively enforce the law
where needed to put an end to
widespread discrimination against
women workers in the maquiladora
factory zones.
Equal Pay for Work of 
Equal Value
The CEACR stated that in the
maquiladora factories, “Most
[women] are concentrated in the
lower wage scales. For example,
women account for 22 percent of
managerial posts, compared with 55
percent of jobs as general workers,
and their wages are lower than those
of men at all levels.”
The CEACR called special atten-
tion to ICFTU comments on equal
pay for work of equal value. It asked
the government to indicate whether
it intends to adopt legislation on 
this principle. The CEACR noted
“with regrets” that the government
merely reiterated earlier pro forma
comments on this point and re-
asserted that Mexican laws “do 
not apply in full the principle set 
out in the Convention.” It went on to
say, “[T]he wording of the national
legislation is inadequate for the appli-
cation of the principle of equal remu-
neration to work which is of equal
value but of a different nature.” The
CEACR insisted that “for the legis-
lation to be in conformity with the
Convention, it should give expres-
sion to the principle of equal remu-
neration for work of equal value.”
The U.S. State Department said:
“The Constitution and labor laws
provide that women shall have the
same rights and obligations as men,
and that ‘equal pay shall be given for
equal work performed in equal jobs,
hours of work, and conditions of
efficiency.’ However, women in the
work force generally are paid less
than their male counterparts and are
concentrated in lower-paying occu-
pations. In February, [the govern-
ment] said that the top 10 percent
of highest paid men earn 50 percent
more than the top 10 percent of
highest paid women, and that the
bottom 10 percent of the lowest
paid men earned 25 to 27 percent
more than the bottom 10 percent 
of the lowest paid women.”
The 2003 Anti-
Discrimination Law
In an encouraging development,
President Fox signed on June 9,
2003, a new Federal Law to Prevent
and Eliminate Discrimination.
Approved by Congress in April
without a single dissenting vote, the
law obligates federal authorities to
apply all measures and resources in
their power to halt discrimination
within their own agencies and in the
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No. 111, Mexico, 73nd Session (2002). In its 2003 Individual Observation the CEACR also noted the Mexican government’s failure to reply
to the ICFTU’s comments about widespread discrimination against indigenous peoples, their lack of employment opportunities, and job
advertisements seeking persons “under 35 years of age, of light skin, and who are physically attractive.”
3 Id.
4 See U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2002, Mexico, Section 5 (2003).
5 Id.
6 See Human Rights Watch, No Guarantees: Sex Discrimination in Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector (1996).
7 See Human Rights Watch, A Job or Your Rights: Continued Sex Discrimination in Mexico’s Maquiladora Sector (December 1998).
8 At their request, the women workers who testified at the public hearing used pseudonyms. 
9 See ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual Observation Concerning Convention
100, Mexico, 74th Session (2003).
10 See John Nagel, “Mexico’s President Fox Signs New Anti-Discrimination Law,” BNA Daily Labor Report, June 11, 2003, p. A-4.
public policy arenas where they have
enforcement jurisdiction. Categories
of discrimination covered by the
new law include ethnic origin; sex;
age; disability; and social, economic,
or health condition. Moreover, the
new law requires authorities to
adhere to obligations under interna-
tional treaties and conventions on
discrimination ratified by Mexico.
These include ILO Convention Nos.
100 and 111 and the UN Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).
The law calls for the creation of a
National Council for the Prevention
of Discrimination to oversee its
implementation. The council is
supposed to draft regulations and set
penalties for violations. However,
law is written in general terms and
does not specify penalties or grant
the council true enforcement powers.
It remains to be seen whether labor
authorities will apply this new law
against employers who require preg-
nancy tests or who discriminate
against women in the workplace.
The head of the labor committee 
of the Mexican employers’ federa-
tion declared that “this new law 
will not have a big impact on the
labor sector.”10
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Child Labor, Forced Labor
In 2000, Mexico ratified ILOConvention No. 182 on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor. It has
not ratified Convention No. 138 on
the Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment. Mexico has ratified
both ILO conventions on forced
labor, Nos. 29 and 105.
Child Labor
As in nearly all developing countries
as well as in sectors of the U.S.
economy, child labor is a serious
problem in Mexico.1 The Constitu-
tion prohibits children under 14
years of age from working. Children
of 14 or 15 years can work in non-
hazardous daytime jobs with their
parents’ permission and a certificate
from the labor department.
Child labor in violation of the law is
not a widespread problem in higher-
end formal sector employment in
large and medium-size companies.
Factory owners usually hire workers
16 and older and require permits for
any 14- and 15-year-old workers
they hire. Workers interviewed at
the Matamoros Garment factory in
Puebla state said that management
sent home the few sub-16 workers
at the plant when auditors from
Puma Corporation visited the
factory in late 2002, because Puma’s
code of conduct called for no child
workers under age 16. However, the
workers said that the sub-16
employees did have parental
permission and work permits from
the labor department.
Mexico has adopted laws and regu-
lations to prevent child labor and
devotes resources to enforcing them.
Enforcement is reasonably effective
in the formal sector where an
inspection and citation system can
operate. However, most child labor
is dispersed in agricultural regions
and in city streets and micro-
employment settings, overwhelming
the child labor law enforcement
system. The U.S. State Department’s
2002 Country Report on Human
Rights Practices summed up the 
situation in the rest of the economy
this way: “Enforcement was inade-
quate at many small companies 
and in agriculture and construction.
It was nearly absent in the informal
sector, and the Government’s efforts
to enforce the law stalled.”2
As president-elect, Vicente Fox was
embarrassed by media exposés in
2000 disclosing that children under
14 were working on his family’s
ranch in San Cristóbal, Guanajuato.
Children 11 and 12 years old earned
$7 a day harvesting onions, potatoes,
corn, peas, broccoli, and squash for
export to the United States.3
The U.S. State Department asserts,
“Reliable current statistics on child
labor in the country do not exist.”
However, a number of sources
provide well-researched estimates of
the extent of child labor. A 1998
report by the U.S. Department of
Labor, based on a survey by Mexico’s
National Institute of Statistics,
Geography, and Data Processing
(INEGI), estimated that more than
one million children ages 12-14
were employed—17 percent of the
children in that age range.4
A 2000 UNICEF report estimated
that approximately 1.5 million chil-
dren work in Mexico’s agricultural
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sector, especially in the northern states
that ship products to the United
States.5 A number of these areas face
labor shortages after many young men
have migrated to the United States,
making child labor sometimes a
matter of family survival.
In comments to the CEACR, the
ICFTU referred to reports suggest-
ing a total of approximately 5 million
working children, 2 million of whom
are under 12 years old. The majority
of working children work for or with
their parents and relatives, often in
agriculture or informal urban activi-
ties such as street vending. Some
children are occupied as beggars.6
Other sectors with high concentra-
tions of child labor include market-
place and construction site moving
and hauling, kitchen help, fireworks
manufacturing, brick making, home-
based apparel work, and other low-
end, mostly informal work settings.
Mexico’s family integration office
estimates that some 135,000 chil-
dren work long hours in the streets
of Mexico City without a fixed
wage. Most are migrants from the
countryside whose parents are
unemployed. Many are entirely
separate from their families.
The ICFTU indicated that the
national education authority report-
ed that 1.7 million school-aged chil-
dren cannot receive an education
because their poverty forced them to
work. The ICFTU also stated that in
the particular case of indigenous
children, access to education is poor,
because education is generally avail-
able only in Spanish and many
indigenous families speak only their
native languages. In its 2003 obser-
vation on Convention No. 182, the
CEACR asked the government to
reply to the ICFTU’s comments.7
Working children themselves
poignantly express the child labor
problem. “I learned how to make
bricks when I was little,” said
Maribel Esquivel, looking over her
shovel at her job in a brick-making
quarry in Ixtapaluca, near Mexico
City. Maribel is 12 years old. She
began work at the brick quarry when
she was 8—the age of her younger
brother working at her side.8
“I work six hours a day, from six in the
morning until six at night,” said
Amador, one of thousands of children
who labor in Mexico City’s Central
de Abastos, the huge central market.
With no schooling, Amador cannot
accurately calculate his working
hours. He has no fixed employer at
the market. He hustles for work
carrying customers’ purchases to their
cars, making between $3 and $10 a
day. Asked about his hopes for the
future, Amador replied, “More work,
here, the same.”9
Forced Labor
Mexico does not engage in govern-
ment-sponsored forced labor. The
Constitution and laws prohibit
forced or bonded labor. However,
enforcement capacity does not
match the scale of the problem.
The U.S. State Department’s 2002
Country Report on Human Rights
Practices cites trafficking of child
workers, migrant workers, and sex
workers as “a serious problem.”
The report points to “credible
reports that police, immigration,
and customs officials were involved
in the trafficking of such persons.”10 
A 2001 UNICEF report estimated
that 16,000 children were victims of
sexual exploitation, including prosti-
tution. The U.S. State Department
described their plight:
“In many cases, those who brought
them in[to] the country promised
them employment in legitimate
occupations. Thereafter they were
30
sold to the owners of bars and other
establishments and then forced into
prostitution to ‘pay off their debts.’
This debt peonage often never ends
because the children accrue more
debt for their meals and housing.
The owners sold or traded the 
children among themselves. Other
children were transported to Mexico
City for ‘training’ and then were
sent to centers of tourism. Some
children are trafficked to the U.S.
and Canada.”
Prison Labor
One key issue within the ambit of
forced labor analysis is the growing
use of prison labor in Mexico. It is
generally recognized in national and
international law that prisoners may
be put to work for rehabilitative or
punitive purposes, or on products or
services used internally by govern-
ment authorities. However, ILO
Convention No. 29 (which Mexico
ratified in 1934) is decisively clear that
any prisoner engaged in labor may not
be “hired to or placed at the disposal
of private individuals, companies, or
associations” (Article 2).
Indeed, Articles 4, 5, and 6 of ILO
Convention No. 29 repeatedly
underscore that prison labor produc-
tion cannot be put to private use in
the larger stream of commerce in
competition with products and serv-
ices provided by free labor. In direct
violation of these strictures, however,
Mexican prison labor is increasingly
being put at the disposal of private
companies. In 2001 the prison
director of Tamaulipas state invited
Mexican maquiladora factories to 
set up shop inside the state’s 11
prisons.11 One furniture manufacturer
took up the offer and began making
chairs and tables for a Texas restau-
rant chain. Workers make less than $5
a day with no benefits, and it is self-
evident that absenteeism and em-
ployee discipline are not concerns.
Imports of products of prison labor
are prohibited under U.S. law; the
Texas importer would not confirm his
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purchases on the record, stating, “I’m
afraid U.S. customs would ruin it.”12
Allowing prison labor of this type
also clearly runs counter to the
NAALC’s labor principles, which
Mexico is “committed to promote.”
Labor Principle 4 calls for “the prohi-
bition and suppression of all forms of
compulsory labor, except for . . . work
generally considered acceptable by
the Parties, such as . . . prison labor
not for private purposes. . . .” However,
as with child labor, the worker rights
advocacy community has not initi-
ated NAALC complaints on prison
labor in Mexico, nor on child labor
and prison labor in the United States,
which are also susceptible to scrutiny
under the NAALC.13 A general 
lack of confidence in the NAALC
based on the meager results of earlier
cases on freedom of association,
discrimination, minimum wages,
health and safety, and migrant
workers’ protection hinders initiatives
on other issues.
1 On child labor in the United States, see Lee Tucker, Fingers to the Bone: United States Failure to Protect Child Farmworkers (New York,
Human Rights Watch, 2000).
2 See U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2002, Mexico, Section 6 (d) (2003).
3 See “Family of Mexico’s President-Elect Hired Young Children for Ranch Work,” Associated Press wire report, September 2, 2000.
4 See U.S. Department of Labor, Efforts to Eliminate Child Labor, Vol. 5 in the By the Sweat and Toil of Children series (1998).
5 Cited in U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2002, Mexico, Section 6 (d) (2003).
6 See ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual Observation Concerning Convention
182, Mexico, 74th Session (2003).
7 Id.
8 See Susan Ferriss, “For Mexico, Child Labor Remains a Rampant Reality,” Austin-American Statesman, October 16, 2000, p. A1.
9 See “A Mexican Child’s Dream: More Work,” Agence France-Presse wire story, November 17, 2000.
10 See U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2002, Mexico, Section 2 (d), 6 (f), (2003).
11 See “Jailhouse Economics,” The Daily Texan, August 2, 2001.
12 See Julie Watson, “Mexicans Tout Prison Labor to U.S.: Companies Told They ‘Will Save Tons of Money,’ ” Chicago Tribune, December 4,
2002, p. 8.
13 See, for example, Lee Tucker, Fingers to the Bone: United States Failure to Protect Child Farmworkers ; Gordon Lafer, “Captive Labor,” The
American Prospect, Sept.-Oct. 1999, p. 66; Rodney Ho, “Mr. Schwab Is Putting His Inmates to Work for the Private Sector,” The Wall
Street Journal, July 22, 1999, p. A10; Edward Wong, “Behind Bars and on the Clock,” The New York Times, June 6, 2001, p. C1.
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Promises Unfulfilled? 
The Future of Worker Rights in Mexico
Mexico’s labor laws andenforcement capacity hold
the potential for making it a model
of effective protection of worker
rights by a developing country
engaged in the global economy.
However, Mexico has not fulfilled
this promise.
The criticisms contained in this
report are not meant to condemn
Mexico for gross violations of human
and worker rights on a level seen in
some other countries. Independent
unions, collective bargaining, and
strikes are not illegal. Shadowy
death squads do not systematically
assassinate trade union leaders and
activists. Ten-year-old children are
not working in export factories.
Armed forces do not compel thou-
sands of workers to labor at the
point of a bayonet.
Even the main problem identified
here—the continued entrenchment
of a corporatist labor system
constraining official unions to pro-
government, pro-employer positions
while independent unions face
discriminatory obstacles—is a
complex one. Official unions make
up the major part of the labor move-
ment in Mexico, and many of their
leaders are elected, legitimate actors
who believe that close ties to govern-
ment at both federal and state levels,
as well as to employers who provide
investment and jobs, best serve their
members’ interests. Moreover, within
this official labor movement, some
individual unions and leaders are
seeking a more independent course.
But Mexico should not be—nor
would one expect that it would want
to be—measured against the worst
worker rights violators and let “off
the hook” on core labor standards
just because it is better than the
worst offenders. The standard of
measurement is contained in the
substance of core labor standards and
in the careful calibration of those
standards by international organiza-
tions, especially over many decades
by the CEACR and CFA. On this
count, the violations of workers’
freedom of association described in
this report find Mexico falling short
of international standards.
Another measurement could be
Mexico’s own potential for becoming
a standard setter among developing
countries in Latin America and
around the world. Mexico has many
advantages for creating a system of
respect for workers’ basic rights: an
increasingly democratic government
and an increasingly independent judi-
ciary, professional civil service and
labor law enforcement mechanisms,
strong trade unions, employers with
capacity to change, robust civil
society, and other assets. Mexico 
can become a model of economic
growth with social justice and 
respect for worker rights.
Mexico and Trade
Agreements
Whether Mexico moves toward
greater compliance with interna-
tional worker rights standards is
still an open question. Worker
rights advocates are concerned
about the Mexican government’s
position against including worker
rights in trade agreements beyond
NAFTA. In particular, Mexico has
opposed strong worker rights provi-
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sions in a hemispheric trade pact.
A free trade agreement of the
Americas (FTAA) might supersede
NAFTA and make the NAALC 
a dead letter. Under a hemispheric
accord, Mexico would lose its privi-
leged position in trade with the
United States and Mexico under
NAFTA. But it would also escape
scrutiny for worker rights viola-
tions, raising the possibility of a
new clampdown on independent
unions that challenge employers’
unilateral power in the workplace.
An important signal of Mexico’s
fulfillment or rejection of core labor
standards will come in months
ahead as the three NAFTA partners
refine their positions on linking
worker rights and trade in hemi-
spheric negotiations. If Mexico
persists in opposing such linkage,
advocates can conclude that it is
walking away from its obligations 
to comply with international worker
rights norms. If instead Mexico
promotes a viable worker rights
provision in a hemispheric pact with
strong, enforceable labor standards,
it will earn new respect for its
commitment to social justice in the
global economy.
Taking Steps to 
Reform the NAALC
In the same connection, whether or
not negotiations go forward on an
FTAA, Mexico could engage its
NAFTA partners in negotiations to
strengthen the NAALC. Reforming
the NAALC can take the following
shape:
■ Eliminate the “three-tier” division
of worker rights, which excludes
certain violations from the full
range of treatment under the
NAALC, to make all violations
subject to review, consultation,
evaluation, and arbitration.
(Currently, violations of rights to
organize, bargain, and strike are
not subject to evaluation or arbi-
tration, and violations of rights
involving forced labor, discrimina-
tion, equal pay, workers’ compen-
sation, and migrant labor are not
subject to arbitration.)
■ Require public hearings and public
participation in all proceedings by
an NAO, an Evaluation Commit-
tee of Experts (ECE), and an
arbitral panel. (Now only the U.S.
NAO requires public hearings as
part of its review process, and
there are no requirements for
public participation in ECE and
panel proceedings.)
■ Require all public hearings and
other means of public participa-
tion to be held at sites most
convenient for petitioners.
■ Specify that an adverse inference
may be made in the preparation of
an NAO, ECE, or arbitral panel
report against private parties who
refuse to participate in public
hearings or in ECE or panel
proceedings. (Most companies
involved in complaints to date
have simply refused to participate,
with no consequences.)
■ Strengthen the independent role
of the Commission for Labor
Cooperation’s Secretariat,
requiring release of all Secretariat
reports except for material error of
fact. (Reports have been held up
for political reasons.)
■ Provide adequate funding for the
Secretariat and for ECEs and
arbitral panels. (The Secretariat’s
budget is incapable of sustaining
large-scale research or supporting
the work of an ECE or arbitral
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panel, which come from the
Secretariat budget.)
■ Specify that a substantial portion
of the Secretariat’s budget must
be devoted to cross-border educa-
tional work such as conference
support and research grants to
trade unions and NGOs.
■ Negotiate a code of conduct for
companies that operate in two or
more NAALC countries, modeled
on the codes already recognized by
the United States, Canada, and
Mexico in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (OECD) Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises
and the ILO Tripartite Decla-
ration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy.
■ Require a labor information audit
by companies operating in two or
more NAALC countries that
would report annually on their
North American operations,
whether under their own corpo-
rate name, wholly or partly owned
subsidiaries, joint ventures, or
other corporate forms, with infor-
mation about their employment
relations and labor practices.
■ Make parent or partner corpora-
tions liable for worker rights
violations of subsidiaries or joint
venture companies—eliminate the
“corporate veil” defense against
worker rights violations.
■ Create a private right of action
that would allow workers and
unions to bring legal actions for
violations of the NAALC’s labor
principles against employers 
in the courts of any of the
NAALC countries.
■ Require targeted trade sanctions
(i.e., loss of favorable NAFTA
tariffs) against companies found
liable under domestic law for
repeated violations of NAALC
labor principles or of a code of
conduct created under the
NAALC.
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Recent Case Studies
K&S Harnesses
K&S Wiring Systems Inc. is a U.S.
subsidiary of Japanese-owned
Sumitomo Wiring Systems, Ltd., with
headquarters in Murfreesboro,
Tennessee. K&S makes wire harness
products for the automotive industry,
principally Nissan, in the central
Mexican city of Aguascalientes. An
affiliate of the official corporatist
union federation held bargaining
rights for workers at the factory. This
official union took out union registra-
tion and held “title” (titularidad) to the
collective agreement under the state
labor board, although labor matters in
the automobile sector are supposed to
come under federal jurisdiction. The
official union also registered with the
federal labor department. It became
clear that this dual registration was
purposely designed to thwart inde-
pendent union organizing.
The official union did not defend
workers’ interests at the K&S
factory. In 1998, workers sought a
new bargaining representative, the
Metal, Steel, and Iron union
(STIMAHCS). STIMAHCS is an
affiliate of the Authentic Labor
Front (Frente Auténtico del Trabajo,
or FAT). The FAT is an independent
labor organization with a reputation
for democratic governance and
strong bargaining for its members.
In August 1998, STIMAHCS filed a
demand for a recuento (an election to
decide which union should bargain
for K&S workers) with the state labor
board of Aguascalientes. The state
board first called for a complete list of
STIMAHCS members at K&S. This
was a highly unusual demand;
normally, only a list of union officers
and governing board members is
needed. STIMAHCS submitted the
list in a sealed envelope with assur-
ances from the state board that the
names would remain confidential.
Shortly after STIMAHCS delivered
the membership list, top K&S
personnel officials called workers
from the list one by one into man-
agement offices and fired dozens
who did not renounce STIMAHCS
membership on the spot. Many other
workers succumbed to the threat of
dismissal and renounced membership
in the independent union. For the
next ten months the state board
erected a series of procedural obsta-
cles, requiring new filings and new
documentation, all the while setting,
postponing, and continuing hearings
in the matter. Often the official union
or the company would fail to appear at
a scheduled hearing, with no action
taken. At the end of this long period
of manipulation and evasion, the state
board said that the case belonged in
front of the federal labor board. The
state board dismissed STIMAHCS’
petition. In the meantime, unfair
dismissal cases for the fired K&S
workers languished without decision
in separate legal proceedings.
Workers’ efforts to win STIMAHCS
representation began anew at the
federal labor board in June 1999. The
federal board created an even worse
obstacle course. It scheduled and
canceled a series of hearings. It made
new and burdensome demands on
STIMAHCS while letting the offi-
cial union stonewall proceedings.
The case dragged on for more than a
year, until finally the labor board
scheduled a representation election
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on September 4, 2000. At this point,
two years after the fired K&S
workers’ dismissal, their cases were
still unresolved.
The vote held inside the K&S factory
on the afternoon of September 4,
2000, was a farce. STIMAHCS offi-
cials sought to have two of its fired
members serve as election observers,
since they knew their co-workers and
could help the union challenge ineli-
gible voters. However, the labor board
agent conducting the election bowed
to K&S managers’ demand that no
ex-employee could enter the plant.
He told STIMAHCS representatives
that K&S would allow only two of
them to enter the facility to observe
the election and that K&S managers
would choose which two. The
STIMAHCS leaders asked the labor
board agent to exercise his authority
to override these demands and to go
forward with the election only if
STIMAHCS could have its chosen
observers at the election. He turned
down the request. On principle,
STIMAHCS leaders refused to enter
the factory under these conditions.
STIMAHCS supporters inside the
factory tell what happened next. One
worker interviewed for this report
said, “Between 11:45 a.m. and 2:00
p.m., the company lawyer called
workers into his office and told them
to vote for the official union. They
told anybody who might support
STIMAHCS not to vote. They told
secretaries and office workers who had
never been in the union to go vote for
the official union. They also had a lot
of new workers who were not on the
voter eligibility list. All these people
voted. A lot of STIMAHCS
supporters were afraid to vote.”
As with most union representation
elections in Mexico, the vote was not
by secret ballot. One by one, workers
had to approach the voting table and
declare orally and openly, in front of
company managers and official union
leaders, which union they preferred.
“I voted for STIMAHCS,” said one
worker. “When I did, the managers
and the official union guys all wrote
down my name. The official union
thugs that were their observers called
me asshole and faggot.”
STIMAHCS appealed the K&S
union election results to the same
labor board that had run the election.
On November 27, 2000—more than
two years after workers first tried to
organize a new, independent union at
K&S—the labor board threw out
STIMAHCS’ objections to the elec-
tion and certified the incumbent offi-
cial union as the workers’ bargaining
representative. The independent
union drive was crushed.
Alcoa
In January 2002, more than 2,000
workers at an auto parts plant owned
by Pittsburgh-based Alcoa Inc.
revolted against a sellout contract
negotiated by their official union.
Union officials surrendered hard-
won seniority protections and other
benefits. Workers had never had an
opportunity to vote on the contract.
Democratic forces in the local
branch of the union succeeded in
replacing official union representa-
tives within the factory, notwith-
standing threats, surveillance, and
physical attacks against independent
activists. “The problem is not the
official union itself,” said Alcoa
worker Andrés Ballasteros, “but
certain corrupt leaders who work
alongside the company to block the
workers’ attempts to fight for their
rights.” The company dismissed a
half-dozen key activists at the behest
of the official union leadership.
Alcoa worker Conrado Sifuentes
recounted:
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“During the demonstrations, some
workers were injured because the
police or Alcoa guards beat them up.
Some demonstrators fainted. The
Social Security Clinic refused to give
any of the injured workers medical
treatment. The Social Security
Clinic, run by the government, is
supposed to help the people, but it
refused to help us when we needed
medical treatment.”
Worker activists from Alcoa were
blacklisted for work in area factories.
An Alcoa worker who did not want
to be identified explained:
“The names of independent union
supporters are written down in books
that are kept by Alcoa management
and the official union. Once you are
fired from Alcoa for participating in
independent union organizing, you
are labeled a troublemaker and your
name is put on a list that is circu-
lated to other companies. Once your
name is on such a blacklist, you are
denied work in other companies
based on your association with the 
independent union organizing at
Alcoa. You are seen as a threat by
the management of the companies.”
The fact that the old union main-
tained “title” to the collective agree-
ment stymied any bargaining by the
new union leaders. In April 2002,
with support from most workers, they
sought a vote to win bargaining
rights at the plant. At the end of
August, the labor board denied their
request for an election, leaving the
old union with official bargaining
rights. The labor board is a tripartite
body with government, employer, and
union representatives. In this case,
the “union seat” on the labor board
was filled by an official from the same
federation being challenged by the
new union formation in the Alcoa
plant—a direct conflict of interest.
The labor board’s denial of a union
representation election set the stage
for a new round of even more egre-
gious violations of workers’ freedom
of association. Throughout Sep-
tember 2002, Alcoa managers sent
security agents to videotape union
membership meetings and to track
the movements of union activists. In
early October 2002, Alcoa manage-
ment fired 20 workers, among 
them the most active independent
union leaders.
Organizer Rafael Salinas described
what happened:
“Alcoa guards were following us, the
independent union organizers, every-
where we went. They were video-
taping us and watching our every
move. After we were fired, we met
regularly to think of different ways
we could fight the injustices at the
plants. Some of these meetings took
place at a public lot in the center of
town and the Alcoa guards would go
by in their van, a dark green Voyager
or Aerostar, with video cameras and
film us. Usually, two Alcoa vans
would come with groups of six to
eight guards inside. Usually, two
guards would be filming with sepa-
rate video cameras.”
One worker who preferred not to be
identified eloquently conveyed her
reasons for sustaining union activity
at Alcoa:
“I fear losing my job as a result of
my association with the inde-
pendent union organizing, but my
participation in the movement for
an independent union is partly to
benefit my children. I must do what
I can to help in the struggle. There
are many more women involved in
the independent union than men.
The women are the mothers in
their families and they feel the
urgent need to fight for their
family’s well-being. The change we
38
hope to achieve through organizing
an independent union on the
workers’ behalf is not only for the
currently employed workers, but 
for our children who may end up
making a similar living working at
the maquilas. I must make my
contribution to the movement now,
not only for the sake of my chil-
dren’s future, but for the sake of 
all the workers’ children and their
respective futures.”
Matamoros Garment
Matamoros Garment began opera-
tions in 1999. It was part of the
massive movement of maquiladora
enterprises into Mexico’s interior
regions after the border maquiladora
zones became saturated with more
than 3,000 factories and more than 
a million workers. The border
buildup put enormous strains on 
the environment, transportation,
water systems, and social services,
prompting many firms to look to 
the interior for new factories.
Mexican workers’ proximity to the
U.S. border in the northern
maquiladora zones also made it easier
for trade unions and NGOs on both
sides of the border to build transna-
tional alliances, pressing companies to
stop abusing workers and the envi-
ronment. Though they still faced
enormous obstacles, workers in some
border areas succeeded in raising
wages and improving conditions.
Sometimes they accomplished this
goal through effective union represen-
tation, both by official union groups
that take seriously the responsibility
to defend their members and by inde-
pendent unions. Sometimes they
formed cross-border coalitions such as
the San Antonio-based Coalition for
Justice in the Maquiladoras (CJM)
and the Piedras Negras-based Comité
Fronterizo de Obreras (CFO), which
conduct extensive worker education
and advocacy programs.
The response of many owners, a
good number from U.S.-based
multinational companies, was an
interior strategy that replicated the
earlier developments of the first
maquiladora boom in the 1960s and
1970s along the border. Companies
set up operations in desperately poor
regions to attract young, inexperi-
enced workers from small towns and
rural villages who were so glad for
factory work at subsistence wages—
in comparison with what they could
make by scratching out a living on
small farm plots—that they would
not organize or push for higher
wages and better conditions.
Some sectors of the official labor
movement met this corporate inte-
rior strategy with one of their own:
arranging “protection contracts”
with the new maquiladora firms.
The official unions promised a labor
control system, backed up by state
government authorities, to dampen
workers’ demands and get rid of
outspoken or dissident workers.
Puebla state was an ideal place to
implement the maquiladora
investors’ interior strategy. It is a
largely rural state, but anchored by a
major city with a large airport rela-
tively close to Mexico City. Dozens
of new factories have sprung up in
Puebla state, among them the
Matamoros Garment factory in
Izúcar de Matamoros, 40 miles
south of Puebla city and three hours
east of Mexico City.
A large apparel factory with capacity
for 1,500 workers, Matamoros
Garment produces a variety of
sportswear and uniforms for interna-
tional brand companies. Before the
plant opened, Matamoros Garment
managers arranged a protection
contract with an official union
patronized by the governor of
Puebla. The governor told company
owners to sign a contract with the
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official union, and the union guaran-
teed labor peace. The contract called
only for compliance with minimum
legal standards and payment of legal
minimum wages.
Workers remained in the dark about
the existence of the union and the
contract. “We knew nothing about
it,” said assistant plant supervisor
and independent union leader
Liliana Tejeda Hernández in a
March 2003 interview. “We never
knew we had a union and we never
saw a union representative. Only
when we started to organize, the
union showed up.”
In January 2003, Matamoros
Garment workers spontaneously
walked off the job to protest
increasingly abusive conditions 
and the official union’s complicity.
“The company was not paying 
our wages on time,” explained
Gabriela Tejeda, another union
leader. “That was on top of all 
the other problems—dirty bath-
rooms and a dirty cafeteria, forced
overtime without overtime pay,
locking us in the factory until we
met production quotas, verbal abuse,
lack of transportation, and more.”
Matamoros Garment workers began
forming a union. “That’s when the
old union started coming around
telling us to stop, that we would get
in trouble, that the company would
close, and other threats,” said
another worker. But workers
persisted in their independent organ-
izing drive, with help from a new
NGO called the Worker Support
Center (Centro de Apoyo al
Trabajador, or CAT).1 CAT rapidly
generated an international solidarity
movement aimed at the plant’s best-
known international brand customer,
the Germany-based Puma corpora-
tion. Trade unions and NGOs
around the world began sending
messages of support to Matamoros
Garment workers and messages of
concern to Puma executives.
Puma responded with a high-level
executive delegation that visited the
plant in early February 2003, five
months after an official “social audit”
by Puma auditors. Besides issuing its
own code of conduct on worker
rights in supplier factories, Puma
also participates in the SA8000
program of Social Accountability
International (SAI), one of the major
organizations that promote corporate
social responsibility through work-
place codes of conduct. According to
workers interviewed for this report:
“Our managers had us clean up our
workstations and the usual mess in
the aisles before the Puma auditors
came in. We had some 15-year-old
girls working in the plant. The
managers told them to stay home
the day of the audit. The managers
told us to answer only ‘yes’ if the
auditors asked us if we were properly
paid and well treated, or if the
company complied with all the laws.
They told us that if we didn’t answer
‘yes’ we would get in trouble and
Puma might pull out their work and
cause layoffs.”
Liliana Tejeda picked up the story
here. “The Puma auditors asked for
private meetings with workers.
Management picked out the most
timid or pro-management workers
who would say the right things.
They didn’t allow any of us who
were known to be discontented to
talk to the auditors.”
Under these conditions, the Puma
auditors gave Matamoros Garment a
“satisfactory” rating for compliance
with its own code and with SA8000
standards in the September 2002
audit. The Puma executive group
that examined conditions in
February 2003 followed similar
methods and got similar results. On
40
February 12, 2003, Puma issued a
report that dismissed workers’
claims. According to the report:
■ Although workers were paid late,
they were ultimately paid full
wages.
■ Flooding from nearby agricultural
fields created dirty conditions in
bathrooms and in the cafeteria,
but a cleaning crew swept out the
cafeteria before employees’ lunch
breaks.
■ Interviewed workers categorically
denied that they were forced,
required, or strongly encouraged
to work overtime.
■ Interviewed workers indicated
that they were never locked in the
factory and that, with a super-
visor’s permission, they could
leave the factory at any time.
■ Interviewed workers said that
they were members of the official
union and that they had freedom
of association.
■ Interviewed workers overwhelm-
ingly denied that physical or
verbal abuse occurred.
■ As for lack of transportation,
routes and schedules had been
restructured to provide a more
cost-effective service network.
After their strike, workers formed an
independent union called the Union
of Matamoros Garment Workers
(Sindicato de Trabajadores de la
Empresa Matamoros Garment, or
SITEMAG) and sought registration
with state labor authorities.
Registration would allow the workers
to challenge the official union’s hold
on their collective agreement.
“That’s when the pressure and the
threats really mounted,” said Liliana
Tejeda. “The plant manager called
us into his office and told us that the
contractors would pull out if we
formed an independent union. He
warned us that the leaders would
become known as troublemakers and
never find work in this area.”
“Strange men started following us
around,” added Gabriela Tejeda.
“They followed us home from work
and followed us shopping. Some-
times they took photographs from a
distance. We never knew exactly who
they were.” These incidents stopped,
she said, when victims filed a crim-
inal harassment complaint with local
police. But much damage was done
to workers’ independent organizing
efforts. “A lot of workers stopped
coming to meetings,” said Liliana
Tejeda. “They said they were afraid
of being targeted by management
and the official union.” Manage-
ment’s continued blaming of lost
orders on the independent union
drive took a toll, too. Many workers
left Matamoros Garment in search of
better, more stable jobs. In late March
2003, managers closed the factory. At
the same time, the local labor board,
made up of government, manage-
ment, and official union representa-
tives, rejected SITEMAG’s request
for registration. This rebuff left
workers undefended by their choice of
an independent bargaining agent.
Instead, the company’s protection
union agreed on plant closing wage
payments short of full severance pay
due to Matamoros Garment workers.
1 The CAT took shape in the aftermath of a successful struggle to establish an independent union in the Kukdong maquiladora factory in
Atlixco, 20 miles north of Izúcar de Matamoros. Student anti-sweatshop groups, human rights organizations, and trade unions in the
United States mounted an effective call on Nike, Reebok, and other brand-name firms contracting with the Kukdong factory to pressure
local management to respect workers’ rights.
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Mexico and Cases Under the NAALC
In addition to its obligations underinternational human rights stan-
dards, Mexico accepted important
obligations under the North
American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC), the labor
side agreement to NAFTA. Along
with the United States and Canada,
Mexico committed itself to enforcing
“high labor standards.” While not
specifically referring to ILO conven-
tions or to core standards contained
in the 1998 Declaration, the
NAALC includes those standards:
freedom of association and the right
to collective bargaining, abolition of
forced labor and child labor, and
non-discrimination in employment.
The NAALC also covers the right to
strike, equal pay for equal work,
minimum employment standards on
wages and hours, workplace health
and safety, workers’ compensation,
and migrant worker protection.
The three NAFTA countries prom-
ised to effectively enforce their laws
that protect these rights. They guar-
anteed strong laws, legal procedures,
and remedies to carry them out.
They have developed a process that
allows worker rights advocates to file
complaints or request investigation 
of specific cases. The process may
involve a number of steps, including
reports, public hearings, ministerial
consultations, independent review
panels, and arbitration boards. The
governments believe that this process
will make the agreement a significant
force for advancing worker rights.
The NAALC has failed to achieve its
high purpose. Apparently more eager
to maintain diplomatic niceties rather
than tackle and solve worker rights
violations, the three governments have
demonstrated a lack of will to hold
one another to their NAALC com-
mitments. Some investigations and
reports have led to significant findings
and recommendations, but they have
not produced change. Ministerial
consultations have resulted only in
research projects and trinational
conferences. Although these are often
informative, they have not directly
addressed or resolved worker rights
violations documented and proven in
NAALC proceedings. The three
governments have not created a single
independent review board or arbitral
panel despite compelling cases for
their establishment.
A review of just a few NAALC
cases in Mexico demonstrates both
a continuing, deeply rooted pattern
of worker rights violations and the
NAALC mechanism’s failure to
halt them.
TAESA
Executive Air Transport, Inc.
(TAESA), was a privately owned
Mexican airline company that
employed some 1,500 workers,
approximately 10 percent of them
flight attendants. TAESA was
formed in 1988 by well-known
Mexican billionaire Carlos Hank
Gonzales, a prominent political
supporter of then newly elected
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.
Hank’s many business ventures
thrived during the Salinas term,
often in connection with the privati-
zation of state-owned enterprises.
TAESA’s fortunes depended signifi-
cantly on favorable treatment under
Salinas’s rule. Among the favors
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TAESA received at the outset was
the granting of employees’ union
representation rights to the National
Union of Air Transport Workers of
Mexico, affiliated with the pro-
Salinas official union federation.
TAESA workers did not form this
union. They were presented with a
fait accompli. There was no vote or
other expression of employee choice.
The incumbent union was part of the
favored “official” labor federation
organically linked to the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) under Mexico’s traditional
corporatist trade union and labor
relations structure.
In 1997, the 150 flight attendants 
at TAESA sought representation 
by the Association of Flight Atten-
dants of Mexico (ASSA), an inde-
pendent, democratic union that was
not part of the PRI-official union
corporatist labor structure. ASSA
was affiliated with the newly formed
National Union of Workers (UNT),
a federation that reflected an inde-
pendent current in the Mexican
labor movement.
Mexico’s largest flight attendants’
union, ASSA represents attendants
at AeroMéxico, Mexicana, and some
regional carriers. ASSA has negoti-
ated good wages and benefits, high
levels of training and skills develop-
ment, strong health and safety rules,
reasonable work schedules, job secu-
rity, non-discrimination clauses, and
other protections for the flight atten-
dants it represents. On the basis of
this record of achievement, TAESA
flight attendants sought to have
ASSA represent them in collective
bargaining. They requested an elec-
tion in early 1997 under a provision
in Mexican labor law whereby an
occupational or a craft union can
obtain bargaining rights for workers
in a particular occupation when a
majority of workers in that craft
desire it. But TAESA managers, with
the complicity of government labor
authorities, struck back against the
flight attendants’ efforts by launching
a series of legal maneuvers to block
the election.
The Election
The entire process of union organi-
zation, recognition, and collective
bargaining is tightly controlled by
Mexico’s tripartite labor boards. The
three-person boards are composed of
government, employer, and trade
union representatives. A representa-
tive of the official corporatist federa-
tion normally holds the union seat
on the labor board, as was the case
with the federal board that handled
the TAESA dispute.
The labor board repeatedly ruled
against ASSA’s request for an election
among TAESA flight attendants.
When appeals courts overturned the
ruling—a process that ultimately took
two years—the board tried a new
tack. It ordered that the election be
held among all TAESA employees,
including pilots, ticket agents, and
ground crew personnel, even though
ASSA insisted that it wanted to
represent only the flight attendants.
The election was held March 22,
1999. In the days leading up to the
vote, managers and representatives 
of the official union unleashed a
campaign of threats and intimidation
against ASSA supporters. Managers
campaigned openly and aggressively
against ASSA through oral and
written threats, denunciations, and
orders to vote against the inde-
pendent union. They used scheduling
and work assignments to make voting
easy for anti-ASSA employees and
difficult for pro-ASSA employees.
TAESA flight attendant and ASSA
supporter Sergio Centeno Mota
described the voting scene:
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“The day of the vote, when we got
to TAESA’s facilities in Mexico, we
could see that there was so much
security that the company had
hired—armed soldiers . . . with
heavy caliber arms, attack dogs, an
electrified wire—to intimidate us
so that we couldn’t go into the
voting area since we were in favor
of ASSA. Outside they had a loud-
speaker system, very loud audio,
that went beyond safe hearing
levels . . . . When they finally let us
go in to vote, they treated us like
when you go into a prison. They
took all the radios, cell phones, so
that we couldn’t communicate. And
their argument was that this was
for security purposes when we were
employees of the company.”
The company provided free trans-
portation for off-duty non-flight
attendants to come and vote against
ASSA. Off-duty flight attendants,
however, had to make their own way
at their own expense to vote. In addi-
tion, managers scheduled many flight
attendants for extra duty away from
voting stations to prevent them from
voting, while allowing on-duty non-
flight attendants to vote at their
convenience. ASSA supporters were
forced to wait for hours. Flight
attendant Carlos Alvarez Tejeda said:
“Those of us who wanted to change
our union, we met very early that
day. And at that time we were still
employees, and we were not given
access to the company. We saw 
how about 1,500 people came to
vote and that they were inside,
and we were left outside. And we
had our uniforms; we had our IDs;
we were outside. It was raining.
It quit raining. It started raining
again. And then it quit raining
again. And then after about six
hours of waiting outside, they 
gave us access.”
The vote was open and oral, not
secret. Workers had to identify
themselves and declare their vote in
the presence of government,
management, and incumbent union
officials. With a flourish, manage-
ment and incumbent union officials
took note of flight attendants who
voted for ASSA.
Flight attendant Jorge Barrientos
Vivas explained why he voted for the
official union:
“I voted for the official union, which
is the other—that was because my
direct boss threatened me that if I
didn’t vote for the official union, I
would be fired like the rest of my
colleagues who voted for ASSA.
And that besides, my career in avia-
tion would be over. I had economic
problems and family problems, and
so I saw myself forced to vote for
the official union.
“I was called at home and told to
come to the airport to the main
area, which we never did. We used
to go just to TAESA’s hangars. I
went to the hangar where the voting
was taking place and on the trip
over there from the main lobby to
the hangar, other company members
threatened me, telling me what I
should do, who I should vote for,
and that I should have no contact
with them because otherwise I
would be fired.
“And when I got to the hangar, I saw
that my colleagues were outside.
They wouldn’t let them in; they were
being threatened with dogs. They
wanted to talk and they put loud
music on the loudspeakers. I voted
for the official union. I was taken to
a little cubicle far away, and I wasn’t
let out until everyone had gone. And
then they let me go home.”
Sergio Centeno recounted the expe-
rience of those voting for ASSA:
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“Entrance into the voting was in
groups of eight, and it wasn’t directly
into the area, it was to the manage-
ment office of the flight attendants
where [managers] would intimidate
us. Again, yet again, so that we
would vote for the official union and
not vote in favor of ASSA.
“Inside the hangar, there were the
voting tables. We had to vote facing
the director of the company. He was
sitting there in front of us. And we
had to say out loud who we were
voting for. There were approximately
300 people [there for the] . . . official
union, when there were only four
people representing ASSA. There
were lots of people who were intimi-
dating us and telling us who we had
to vote for, and telling us that if we
didn’t vote for the official union we’d
be fired immediately.
“And if that wasn’t enough, when it
was my turn to vote, I was asked by
the polling staff who I was going to
vote for. I said I was going to vote
for ASSA. I was asked again. ‘Are
you sure you want to vote for
ASSA?’ And I said, ‘Yes.’ And he
said ‘Well, okay.’”
Attorney José Luis Mendoza García
was one of the four ASSA represen-
tatives who observed the election. He
described the experience as follows:
“TAESA only allowed four of us to be
there while the management had
everyone there that they felt that
they wanted to have there. And the
other union, they let them intimidate
the workers, pressure the workers.
“In the case of TAESA, the tally, the
vote was taken as follows. Behind the
voting table, they had high chairs
where the company’s manager was
seated with the management team
looking down and observing how
each worker’s vote was going. At the
same time, they had another little
booth where the workers would first
go in and they were asked who they
were voting for.
“There they could tell if they were
going to vote for ASSA, they would
be fired . . . . But to ask a worker
ahead of time how they were going
to vote to intimidate them—when
we told the notary publics who were
present there who were certifying
the vote, when we told them what
was going on and we asked them to
suspend this proceeding, they didn’t
accept it and the intimidation
continued to the end.”
ASSA President Alejandra Barrales
told what happened when the union
filed immediate objections to the
conduct of the election:
“We let the authorities know. We
told them about the problems that
our fellow flight attendants had.
Some of them were taken to a room
and they were told that they were
going to tell them how they had to
vote. We took this to the authorities
and the authorities told us they
could do nothing because the
company was the one that decided,
and it was the official union that
had the power there.
“And we called four or five different
times the Undersecretary of Labor
to let this person know what was
going on. And we did so to request
that there could be greater impar-
tiality on behalf of the authorities 
. . . we wanted to make sure that
they knew that there had been
police there and all the other things
we mentioned. But the authorities
told us, ‘Well, that’s private prop-
erty, and the company can do what
it feels is appropriate.’ ”
The results of the election were
predictable. An overwhelming
majority of flight attendants indeed
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voted for ASSA. But most of the
other 1,350 workers voted against
the flight attendants union.
After the vote, TAESA managers
launched a vicious retaliatory assault
against workers who had voted for
ASSA. The union took advantage 
of the notorious “exclusion clause”
permitted under Mexican labor 
law, whereby companies have to 
fire workers expelled from union
membership by leaders out to 
crush internal dissidence. ASSA
supporters were fired and replaced
by newly hired flight attendants
who were told that their jobs
depended on renouncing ASSA.
Fired flight attendants never
received a written statement of
cause for dismissal as required 
by law. Managers just orally fired
them. As Carlos Alvarez said,
“In my case they didn’t tell me
absolutely anything. They just 
said, ‘Sign this sheet because you are
no longer an employee and leave.’”
Sergio Centeno described his
dismissal:
“At that time the only thing they
gave me to sign was a resignation.
As if I wanted to resign. And since
I didn’t sign this paper for obvious
reasons, they fired me. They fired
me. I was ushered out with security
guards. And I was given no further 
explanation. We presume, we know
that it’s because I was a sympa-
thizer of ASSA.”
The discharged ASSA supporters’
only legal recourse was to bring
complaints before the very same
labor board that had engineered the
delays and the election travesty that
had led to their firings, including a
representative of the incumbent
union’s parent federation. Their cases
languished for years without resolu-
tion. Economic necessity forced
them, one by one, to accept severance
pay and release all legal claims.
The NAALC Complaint
ASSA and the U.S. flight attendants’
union, the Association of Flight
Attendants (AFA), filed a joint
complaint under NAFTA’s labor side
agreement. The U.S. NAO issued a
highly critical report. Workers’ testi-
mony was credible, the NAO con-
cluded, and “suggests that TAESA
management and labor union repre-
sentatives participated in threats and
intimidation for the purpose of
affecting the outcome of the election.
It is indicative of a chaotic atmos-
phere where the ability of workers to
exercise free choice is questionable.”
On the voting procedure, the U.S.
NAO found that:
“Voting could be affected if the
employees must state their choice
openly before management whose
preferences have been made clear
and before an excessive number of
union representatives utilizing
intimidation tactics. There is signif-
icant information that such intimi-
dation occurred at the TAESA
union representation election. . . .”
On ASSA supporters’ firings, the
NAO said, “Considering the timing
of the dismissals and that the dis-
charged workers were associated
with the challenging union, it
appears plausible that the workers’
dismissals occurred because of their
participation in union organizing
activities.”
The U.S. NAO called for ministerial
consultations in the TAESA case.
Nothing came of this procedure.
Without an effective enforcement
mechanism, such “soft law” measures
do nothing to change the behavior
of an employer and a government
bent on violating workers’ rights.
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ITAPSA
Echlin, Inc., based in Branford,
Connecticut, produces and distrib-
utes automobile replacement parts in
the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. In Mexico, workers at
Echlin’s ten ITAPSA plants make
parts for auto braking systems.
ITAPSA employs approximately 350
people in its Reyes plant, located in
Ciudad de los Reyes, a municipality
in the State of Mexico.
An official corporatist union held
bargaining rights for workers at the
Reyes plant. Though the workers
knew that they had a union, none of
them had a copy of their contract. In
1996, Reyes workers approached the
STIMAHCS affiliate of the inde-
pendent FAT to seek union repre-
sentation. STIMAHCS began an
organizing drive at the plant.
Workers’ main concerns involved
low wages, hazardous working
conditions, abusive supervisors,
sexual harassment, and the official
union’s failure to respond to their
problems. Several workers had died
or become seriously ill. They were
forced to handle asbestos without
proper protections and ventilation.
As ITAPSA worker Ruiz Rubio put
it, “The main issues we were dealing
with were hygiene and worker safety.
The machinery at the factory is old
and in disrepair and there is a lot of
[asbestos] dust. There have been
many accidents. About five years 
ago two brothers drowned in the
large caustic soda containers. Several
people have lost fingers; one man
lost four of the five fingers on his
left hand.” According to Rubio,
“When [employees] would tell the
union representative at ITAPSA of
problems such as abuse by supervi-
sors he would just tell them that
they should be thankful that they
have jobs at all and that they
shouldn’t be complaining about 
such things.”
On May 26, 1997, STIMAHCS
filed a petition with the federal
labor board for bargaining rights on
behalf of ITAPSA employees. Soon
afterward, agents of both ITAPSA
management and the official union
began a campaign of intimidation
against the employees at the Reyes
plant. As STIMAHCS official
Benedicto Martínez described it,
“They watched workers very closely,
trying to determine which workers
sympathized with the union.
They questioned workers about
their support for STIMAHCS,
in some cases threatening and
harassing workers. . . . In some cases
they tried to intimidate workers and
their families.”
STIMAHCS supporter Hernández
Cruz explained, “We knew we were
being watched by supervisors and 
the official union delegates in the
plant. They knew who the support-
ers of the union were. Every time 
we, as workers who supported
STIMAHCS, would get together 
in the plant, one of the bosses 
would immediately come over to
where we were.”
Reyes worker Javier Velázquez added,
“We were being subjected to a more
than normal level of surveillance in
our jobs. A week before the elections,
I and other members felt placed under
especially rigorous surveillance where
if more than two or three people
began to talk, the supervisor would
come to see what we talked about.”
Several workers reported that supervi-
sors and official union leaders directly
asked them whether they supported
STIMAHCS or knew which workers
did. Rubén Ruiz said that a plant
security guard told him not to get
involved in forming an independent
union or “you will just end up hurting
■ JUSTICE for ALL
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 7
The Struggle for Worker Rights IN MEXICO
47
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 7
yourself.” Javier Velázquez said that
ITAPSA and official union leaders
“told many workers that they should
not come to the election because
there would be trouble and violence.”
According to worker Gildardo
Hernández, an official union leader
told him that ITAPSA would close
the plant or fire STIMAHCS
supporters if STIMAHCS won the
election. Hernández went on to say:
“I was called into the office of the
Human Resources Director of the
company. She asked me who was
going to vote for STIMAHCS. She
told me if I voted for STIMAHCS
I would lose my job at ITAPSA and
I would have difficulty getting a job
anywhere else because ITAPSA
would advise other companies
about my union activities.”
Between the time STIMAHCS filed
its petition and the date of the repre-
sentation election, ITAPSA fired
about 50 employees whom managers
suspected of being STIMAHCS
supporters. Many were fired after
company and official union leaders
threatened them in one-on-one
conversations that they would be
discharged if they supported
STIMAHCS.
Describing his dismissal by an
ITAPSA manager, Javier Velázquez
said:
“He said I was fired because I had
been seen talking with people from
STIMAHCS, and that if I did not
want to be fired I had to tell him
who these people were and that I
had to name all the workers in the
plant who were involved in organ-
izing with STIMAHCS. He said
that if I told them all that informa-
tion, I could save my job.”
Another worker, who did not want to
be identified, said that an ITAPSA
manager “told me I was fired. He
told me there were orders from the
U.S. owners of ITAPSA that he must
fire all of the people who were
causing trouble here at ITAPSA and
that my name was on the list.”
The Election
On September 8, 1997—the day
before the scheduled representation
election—Echlin Divisional
Manager Guillermo Vela Reyna 
met with both first- and second-
shift employees to inform them 
that they “should vote for the official
union and that if STIMAHCS
should win they would suffer 
serious consequences.”
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on that
day, a white Thunderbird with
Mexico City license plate number
828GTH entered the plant.
Workers identified the driver as an
agent of the Judicial Police of the
State of Mexico who worked in the
municipality of Los Reyes. Workers
inside the plant reported that arms
were taken from the trunk of the
car. Subsequently, workers saw
unknown armed men patrolling the
factory grounds.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on
September 9, the company
permitted two buses and a white
truck to enter the plant. These
vehicles carried approximately 170
people armed with sticks, chains,
bars, tubes used for gas, and thin
copper rods. These golpeadores
(thugs) remained in and around the
plant until around 3:00 p.m. the
following afternoon, long after the
election was over. Their conduct
was coordinated by top ITAPSA
managers and official union leaders.
At 6:00 a.m. on September 9, about
15 STIMAHCS supporters, some
wearing stickers that read “Mi voto
es para STIMAHCS” (“My vote is
for STIMAHCS”), approached the
Reyes plant. Immediately, a large
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group of thugs surrounded the
workers and threatened to beat
them if they did not leave. Some
thugs appeared to be members of
the judicial police force.
The STIMAHCS supporters
returned at about 11:00 a.m. with
close to 100 other workers. The
thugs, who were still manning the
plant entrance, prevented the 
group from going inside. They
threw bottles and stones at the
STIMAHCS supporters and at
NGO observers, yelling at them 
and threatening to beat and rape
them. Meanwhile, these thugs
permitted official union supporters,
as well as non-employees, to enter
the plant to vote.
Voting conditions inside the
ITAPSA factory violated elementary
norms of freedom of association.
Only three STIMAHCS representa-
tives were permitted to enter the
Reyes plant to observe the election.
Some 20 representatives of the offi-
cial union filled the room. Voting
took place in an atmosphere of
intimidation and threats of physical
violence. As one observer explained,
“The passageway into the room 
was filled with the official union
men standing against the walls.
On the side of the room through
which workers were to enter and
vote, there was a gauntlet of men
wearing official union stickers.
The group of people practically
reached the voting table.”
Workers entering the plant to vote
were forced to walk this gauntlet of
official union leaders and their thugs
armed with pipes and sticks, who
verbally threatened them and their
families. ITAPSA and the official
union brought in many individuals to
vote who had never worked at
ITAPSA. STIMAHCS observer
Benedicto Martínez noted:
“It was impossible to really know if
anybody voting was really a worker
at ITAPSA. . . . At no time did the
labor board representatives take
responsibility for the impartiality of
the election process, although we
objected a number of times and
asked that the election be suspended
because we were unable to verify
that the people who voted were
entitled to do so.”
STIMAHCS attorney Arturo
Alcalde asked the labor board agent
to suspend the voting, arguing that
these conditions were unacceptable.
The board agent denied the request.
When the votes were counted, the
official union prevailed, 170-29.
The NAALC Complaint
A broad-based coalition of nearly 50
trade unions and allied organiza-
tions across North America filed
NAALC complaints before the
NAOs of both the United States
and Canada in 1997 and 1998. In
response, the two NAOs issued
sharply critical reports that called
for ministerial consultations in the
case. However, the NAALC process
was powerless to remedy abuses at
the Reyes plant. The official union
remained in control of bargaining,
and STIMAHCS supporters were
fired or intimidated into silence.
Ministerial consultations in the
ITAPSA case and another case
involving the Han Young auto parts
factory in Tijuana resulted in a “minis-
terial agreement” in which Mexico
appeared to commit itself to “efforts . . .
to promote the use of eligible voter lists
and secret ballot elections over the
right to hold the collective bargaining
contract . . . and promote secret ballots
and neutral voting places.” However,
as the next case demonstrates, the
agreement was a dead letter from the
time it was signed.
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Duro Bag
The Duro Bag case calls into ques-
tion whether the U.S. and Mexican
governments will uphold or ignore
the commitments they made
pursuant to the NAALC.
The facts of the case were similar to
earlier ones involving events at
ITAPSA, but with a key difference.
The ITAPSA case led to a ministe-
rial agreement between the United
States and Mexico that secret ballot
votes in a neutral site would replace
open, oral “votes” in front of man-
agement and official union leaders.
But Duro Bag workers were denied
such a secret ballot election—in
direct violation of this agreement.
Duro Bag Manufacturing Company
is a multinational producer of high-
quality, premium shopping bags for
well-known retail sales companies
such as Hallmark, Nieman Marcus,
Banana Republic, and The Limited.
Based in Ludlow, Kentucky, with
several plants around the United
States, Duro set up operations in
Mexico in the 1970s to take advan-
tage of low-wage labor for high-
volume, labor-intensive production.
Duro’s plant in Río Bravo,
Tamaulipas, employs hundreds of
workers making $6.00 to $10.00 
per day.
When Duro began operations in
Mexico, the company arranged for
union representation through a
“protection contract” with a union
that promised a docile, controlled
workforce with no labor “unrest.”
Workers had no voice in the selec-
tion of a union; there was no vote of
any kind. In 1999, concerned about
low wages and hazardous working
conditions, Duro workers began
organizing a democratic current
within the pro-management union.
Managers responded by firing key
leaders and active workers. Frustrated
by these tactics, workers formed a
new independent union to seek titu-
laridad (“title”) to the collective
bargaining agreement.
In filing their application for a repre-
sentation election, Duro workers
requested a secret ballot election at a
neutral site with guarantees of free,
fair, non-coercive conditions for the
election. Mexican labor law does not
specify the precise form of a union
representation election (called a
recuento) for transferring “title” from
one union to another, nor does it
stipulate whether such an election
should be by secret ballot at a neutral
site. However, the law does not
preclude a secret ballot.
On election day, March 12, 2001,
the atmosphere was circus-like, as
loud rock music blared over factory
loudspeakers to drown out calls
from independent union supporters.
But it was also physically intimi-
dating. Managers allowed thugs
from the incumbent union organi-
zation to throng the voting area
while refusing admittance to inde-
pendent union supporters and 
international observers. Workers
had to run a gauntlet of supervisors
and opponents of the independent
union, as well as openly and orally
state their choice of bargaining
representative in front of manage-
ment, government, and company
union officials. Under these condi-
tions, only 501 of more than 
1,200 workers voted, and only 
four indicated support for the 
independent union.
The government of Mexico stood
silent while Duro management
negated its international agreement
with the United States. The govern-
ment of Mexico failed to assert the
terms of the ministerial agreement to
its own federal labor board, again
standing silent while the board disre-
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garded the commitment to neutral
site secret ballot elections.
The NAALC Complaint
The government’s failure to abide by
the terms of the ministerial agree-
ment in the Duro case did not stop at
the Mexican border. The U.S.
Department of Labor refused to
accept a complaint, filed in June 2001
by the AFL-CIO and the Paper,
Allied-Industrial, Chemical &
Energy Workers International
Union (PACE), that cited Mexico’s
reneging on the ministerial agree-
ment. The U.S. government chose
not to hold the Mexican government
accountable for violating the agree-
ment. Defending its action, the U.S.
Department of Labor said, “[W]e
remain committed to addressing
worker rights in North America . . .
we have forged a strong and deep
relationship with the Government of
Mexico on labor issues that will lead
to a more meaningful collaboration.
As we deepen the relationship and
build greater trust, we will be even
better able to address worker rights
issues and find cooperative ways to
move them forward.”
This example raises concerns that
the United States and Mexico may
be abandoning the labor principles
of the NAALC. The two countries
pledged to open themselves up to
review and criticism and to “strive to
improve” labor laws and labor law
enforcement. Instead, the record on
the NAALC appears to signal an
intention to downplay worker rights
in free trade talks for Central
America and for a hemispheric
agreement. For this reason, it is all
the more important that trade
unions and their allies mobilize to
ensure that the CAFTA and FTAA
agreements contain strong, enforce-
able worker rights provisions.
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G L O S S A R Y
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CAB Conciliation and Arbitration Board 
CAT Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador (Worker Support Center)
CDHDF Human Rights Commission of the Federal District 
CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
CFA Committee on Freedom of Association 
contrato de protección protection contract (a contract signed between a company and an official union without the
employees’ knowledge)
contrato simulado pretend contract
ECE Evaluation Committee of Experts
FAT Frente Auténtico del Trabajo (Authentic Labor Front)
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
ILO International Labor Organization
ISI import substitution industrialization 
maquila, maquiladora offshore processing industry (also known as export processing zone)
NAAEC North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
NAALC North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAO National Administrative Office for the NAALC
NGO non-governmental organization 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAN National Action Party
PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party 
recuento union representation election
requisa takeover and continued operation of a business facing a strike
STIMAHCS Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Metálica, Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Similares (Union of
Metal, Steel, Iron, and Allied Workers)
titularidad title, bargaining rights in a workplace
N O T E S
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AMERICAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY/AFL-CIO
1925 K Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, DC 20006
www.solidaritycenter.org
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“From the legal loopholes that help perpetuate the corporatist structure of industrial relations, to the tripartite
labor law authorities’ bias against independent unions, to the government’s failure to put a stop to pregnancy
discrimination, this report concisely and incisively identifies the shortcomings in Mexico’s labor regime that
prevent workers from exercising their human rights. With sharp, compelling case studies, the report also demon-
strates the failure of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation to bring meaningful improvement.
The invaluable conclusions, lessons, and recommendations set forth here should be carefully studied and taken to
heart not only by Mexican authorities but by policymakers crafting the texts of future free trade accords.”
Carol Pier
Labor Rights and Trade Researcher
Human Rights Watch
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“Through detailed data and personal case studies, this report provides a systematic analysis of the labor situa-
tion in our country. It is a valuable tool for understanding the reality of worker rights. It should be reproduced
and distributed to a wide audience.”
Arturo Alcalde Justiniani
Independent Mexican Labor Lawyer
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“This detailed study on worker rights violations in Mexico not only addresses legislative problems, but also
documents cases that illustrate those violations. Lance Compa demonstrates once again his firm grasp of
working conditions at the international level, especially in Mexico. The study will be extremely useful to union
leaders, employer executives, and public officials, particularly in NAFTA-signing countries.”
Enrique de la Garza
Professor, Mexico’s Autonomous Metropolitan University-Xochimilco
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“The Solidarity Center’s report can provide a basis for collective initiatives (e.g., social dialogue) aimed at
strengthening law and practice in relation to freedom of association, collective bargaining, and discrimination in
the country. The report contains much information that can prove useful for development assistance and technical
cooperation efforts directed at improving wages, working conditions, and the quality of life of workers in Mexico.”
Michael Sebastian
Deputy Director, Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV)
International Labor Organization
